Defending Mahan's assertion of maintaining a strong navy, one that can fight.
line and Incapable of sallying forth to do harm would be left quite out of the account In diplomatic negotiations, and so would deter nobody from making war on us. The power to hurt Inspires fear, and this brings Capt. Mahan to a most Important point in his argument. In order to act as an effective deterrent the power to hurt need by no means be Increased to the degree where It bcomes the power to destroy any and every as sailant. That is to say, we do not need a navy as powerful as Great Britain In order to defend our territory and our In terests against Great Britain, for the simple reason that she cannot afford to send against us her entire force, nor even one-half one-half one-half of It. HlinrWM TAP IlllttV W fcM.M ... twenty battleships in commission for war in imnr usyi, uu idi we uaa inreateD-trta inreateD-trta inreateD-trta trouble with either German. Great Britain, or Russia. There Is not one Af f i.m. Mnt Clrm TlHt.ln , K - . . . i . afford to' send over her twenty-five twenty-five twenty-five battle- battle- smpe. wnico wouiu oe me very leweet needed, seeing the distance of their ope rattans rattans from hrm whll. w hav e4 An i ports: whll Great Britain, relying wholly on her navy for the Integrity of her em pire, equally cannot afford the hostility of a p. anon nannng twenty Battleships and wun wnwm wr fxjtnia 01 curxerenoe are inconsequential ua- ua- t her as they are with ! Tht teaching of that Illustration u that if w keep a strong navy and live Justly w need fear no war. Th point a to th rsiauv strength of our navy fa of very great tmportanc. We may easily persuade our short-sighted short-sighted short-sighted statesmen th West that a navy of twenty battle. hips and th oampiement of 1 Ughtsr craft is tor th Natiotv- Natiotv- taxes must be viewed by Mr. Dinglet with apprehension and alarm. Because, since it will appear that thev mn h trusteU to produce revenue without re- re- spect anticipatory Importations or oth- oth- er unbertainUea, there will be likely to arise a feeling that thev ri,t tn w maintained. and that 'the kind of tariff whicbJ fail if it produces revenue, and also can suoh falls if It does not produc revenue, properly be abandoned, and only llutiea retained a are sure of pro- pro- ductng revenue. But thJs Is not the whole case. There is no Boubt that th war win result In a quite irresistible movement for the com- com- merolU expanslon of the United Statea We snail insist upon dolnsr mor im.i. than tve have heretofore done with the western shore of the Pacific Ocean. A tariff k-hich k-hich k-hich keep Kuropean good out of America is evidently not a tariff tht win let American goods In Increased quantl- quantl- tie ihto Asia. We stranx-lv stranx-lv stranx-lv nKi. Rusalk and Germany building tariff about their several claim in and Insist upon th British policy fences China. of " any this the open door." W hart not made jfncisl pronounoemeiit in favor of yet. being moved, apparently, by riorssiieratlon : for th feelings of Dikolxt. But tbat cannot last kmx. Th whole trading i atrt of th country will soon demand that w secure our share of the trade of th East, and that to that end w : will upon th open door. But how W look If w notify Osuvn. usu we dmsAd aa open door U It the is of a th to tt