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forming pre-Tet missions. As of lale March, 4G4 of the 535 black uaiama RD teams are back in the hamlets— aboul 77 per cent. This is encouraging . , . Intangible Factors Our biggest cuiiccrn in all areas lies in the greater fear and anathv anione ihe rural population, some loss of confi-1 dence in GVN abilltv to protect tnem, and a greater deiensive- mindedness among UVN security forces worried over renewed VC attacks. These intangible factors are ditlicult to measure, but we think they are already chansins for the better. Q. What lessons from the Tel assault have been learned which can help against the next gener al otiensive wnicn me commu nists say they plan for this summer and fallV 4 The most ohv:ous lesson is always to expect the unexpect-rd. I dmibL the GVN really ex pected such blatant violation of me lei iruce. in my juugiiu.-m, the initial success of the enemy's Tet offensive sprang largely from a combination of Obtimum surnrise and meticulous nre- ptamiiiuT. ffe gained local sur prise botn by attacking during Vietnam's biggest holiday when the I.VN was most oil guard and by attacking cities rather tian trie tiamlcls. Some Thlnis Laekinc But another kev lesson from the Tet offensive is that despite surprise, the enemy lacked the capability to sustain ma initial tiipppsfl in nnnpli-alinir manv towns. He did not get the Vietnamese Armed Forces collapse or popular response fie expect ed, ii ne was aciua v so mucn stronger than previously estimated, why couldn't he hang on longer or exploit more fully? So I see a second lesson of the ,Tet offensive in the enemy's tack nl sufficient strength to exploit his initial advantage. wc nave also learned mat we must devote more attention to protecting the cities, although it is doubitui wnetner ttie vu