The Windsor Star from Windsor, Ontario, Canada on May 22, 1935 · 7
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The Windsor Star from Windsor, Ontario, Canada · 7

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Windsor, Ontario, Canada
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Wednesday, May 22, 1935
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7
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: PAGE SETKH inpr I AM C"3 UvJU Mil 11 hall THE BOTTOER CITIES 8TAH, VTSTTSOH, "TVEmSBAT, "WAY 22. 1935 If 1 BJ)E Fuehrer Adopts Conciliatory Tone BERLIN, May 22. Following are textual extracts from Reichsfuehrer Adolf Hitler's speech before the German Reichstag yesterday, embodying his most important points: Purpose of Session Members of the Reichstag: The present session has been called to enable me to give you the explanation I feel Is necessary to understand the attitude and the decisions made by the German Government on the great problems of the time which concern us all. I am happy to be able to give such explanation from this place because danger Is thereby obviated to which conversations in a smaller circle are liable: namely, that of misinterpretation . I conceive It my duty to be perfectly franlc and open in addressing the nation. I frequently hear from Anglo-Saxon countries expressions of regret that Germany has departed from those principles of democracy which In those countries are held particularly sacred. This opinion is entirely erroneous. Germany, too, has a "democratic" constitution. The present National Socialist Government also has been appointed by the people and feels Itself responsible to the people . The German people have elected with 38 million votes, one single . deputy as its representative. This is perhaps the sole essential difference between the German Reich and other countries. It means, however, that I feel just as much responsible to the people as any Parliament can. As fuehrer-chancellor and chief of the Reich Government, I have often to make decisions which often are weighty enough but the weight of which still is made heavy by the fact I cannot share my responsibility or shift It to other shoulders When the late Reich president called me January 30, 1933, to form a new government to take over the affairs of state, millions of our people doubted whether this undertaking could succeed. Our situation was such that our enemies were filled with hope and our friends with sadness After lour years disastrous war, a dictated peace left us with a situation which -can be summed up as follows: Post-War Problem The nation had surplus labor capacity, it was short of the necessities of life, food and raw materials. The foreign markets available to us were too small and were getting smaller. The result thereof was paralyzed Industry, annihilated agriculture, ruined bourgeoisie, devastated trade, terrific debt burdens, shattered public finances, six and a half million registered unemployed who In reality, however, exceeded seven and a half millions. Some time the course of the World War and its sequels will be recognized as classical refutation of the naive view unfortunately held by many statesmen before the war that the welfare of one European state is best served by the economic destruction of another . We all are convinced the economic autarchy (self-sufficiency) of all states as seems threatened now, Is unwise and can only be detrimental In the end to all. If it Is allowed to go on, the consequences to Europe will be exceedingly mis-chievious . Restrictions on Imports and the self-manufacture of substitutes for foreign raw materials ' call for a planned economy which is a dangerous undertaking: because every planned economy only too easily leads to bureaucratization. We cannot wish for an economic system that borders on Communism and benumbs productive energy. It substitutes an Inferior average for the law of survival of the fittest and going to the wall of the weaker. . . . Yet, knowing all this, we embarked upon this procedure under the hardest pressure of circumstances. What we achieved was only possible because the living energy of the whole nation was behind it. First we had to halt the ever-shifting wages and price movements; then we had to reconstruct the whole fabric of the state by removing all employer's and employe's organization. The essential factors were maintenance of Internal quiet and the time element. We can only regret the world still refrains from taking the trouble to examine objectively what has been achieved here In the last two and a half years, or study a Weltanschauung to which these achievements is wholly due. . . . If present-day Germany stands for peace, it is neither because of wenkness nor cowardice. . . . National Socialism rejects any Ideas of national assimilation. National Aims It is not our desire or intention to take away the nationality, culture or language of any peoples or ' Germanize them by force. We do not order any Germanization of r.on-German names. We do not believe that in present-day Europe denationalization Is possible anyway. The permanent state of war that Is called Into being by such procedures may seem useful to different political and business Interests: for the peoples It spells only burdens and misery. The blood that has been spilt on the European continent In 300 years stands In no proportion to the results obtained. After all, France remained France; Germany, Germany; Poland, Poland; Italy. Italy. What dynastic egoism, political passions and patriotic delusions achieved by shedding oceans of blood has, after all, only scratched the surface of peoples. now much better results would have been achieved if the nations had applied a fraction of their sacrifices to more useful purposes? . . . Every war means a drain of the best elements. Victory can only mean a numerical addition to the victor nation's population; how much better If the Increase of popu lation could be brought about by natural means, a national will to produce children of its own! . . . None of our practical plans will be completed before 10 or 20 years to come; none of our idealistic objects will come to fulfilment In 50 or perhaps 100 years. We all shall only live to see the first beginnings of this vast revolutionary development. What could I wish but peace and quiet? If anyone says this Is only the wish of leadership I can reply the peoples themselves have never wished for war. Reich Wills Peace Germany needs and wills peace! If Mr. Eden says such assurances mean nothing and that signature under collective treaties is the sole guarantee of sincerity, I beg him to reflect that in every case it is a matter of assurance. It is often far easier to put one's signature under a treaty with mental reservations as to what action to take later, than to champion a pacific policy before the whole nation, because that nation rejects war. I could have signed 10 treaties, but that would not have the weight of the declaration made to France the time of the Saar plebiscite. If I, as Fuehrer, give my assurance that with the Saar problem settled we will make no further territorial demands on France, this assurance Is a contribution to peace which is more important than many a signature under many a pact. I believe that with this solemn declaration a quarrel of long duration between two nations really ought to be ended. We made It because we felt this conflict and the sacrifices for both nations connected therewith stand In no proportion to the object that without ever itself being asked, has again been the cause of so much general suffering and misfortune, and would continue to be so. When however, such a declaration received really the evaluation of being taken cognizance of then, naturally, there remained nothing for us to do except also take cognizance of this reply. It is a queer thing that In the historical life of peoples there are veritable Inflations of conceptions which can only with difficulty ctand in ttfe face of exact examination by reason. For some time, for Instance, the world has lived In a veritable mania of collective effort, collective security, collective obligations, et cetera: all of which terms at first blush seem to have concrete contents, but on closer examination afford the possibility of at least many interp-possibility of at least many interpretations. Collective Efforts What does collective co-operative effort mean? Who determines what collective co-operation Is and what' It is not? Has not the conception of collective co-operation for 17 years been interpreted In the most different manner? I believe I am putting It right when I say that in addition to many other rights the victor states of the Versailles Treaty also arrogated to themselves the right to define without contradiction what constitutes collective co-operation and what does not constitute co-operation. If here and now I undertake to criticize this procedure, I do It because thereby is the best possible way to make clear the Inner necessity of the last decisions of the Reichs Government and to awaken an understanding of our real intentions. The present day idea of collective co-operation of nations Is essentially the spiritual property of the American president, Wilson. The policies of the period before the war were rather more determined by the idea of alliances of nations brought together by common interests. Rightly or wrongly, this policy at one time was made responsible for the outbreak of the World War. Its end, as far as Germany was concerned, was hastened by the doctrine of 14 points of Wilson and threj points which later complemented them. In them were contained essentially the following ideas for preventing the recurrence of a similar catastrophe to humanity: Peace was not to be one of onesided right but a peace of general equality, thereby of general right. It was to be a peace of reconciliation, of disarmament of all, thereby security for all. From it was to result, as Its crowning glory, the idea of Interna-national collective co-operative effort of all states and nations In the League of Nations. I must from this place once more state emphatically there was no people anywhere trho more eagerly took up these ideas than the Germans. . . . Blow to Co-operation When In the year 1919 the peace of Versailes was dictated to the German people the death sentence had thereby been pronounced on collective co-operation of peoples. For Instead of equality of all came classification Into victors and vanquished; In place of equal rights, differentiation between those entitled to right and those without right; In place of reconciliation of all, punishment of the vanquished; in place of international disarmament, disarmament defeated. . . . Germany, fairly renouncing herself, on her part created all the conditions for co-operation of a collective nature to meet the ideas of the American president. Well, at least after this German disarmament h.id taken place, the world on its part ought to have taken the same step for restoring equality .... What, however, happened? While Germany loyally fulfilled the obligations of the treaty dictated to her, the so-called victory states failed to fulfil what the treaty obliged them suhseouently to fulfil. . . . If one attempts today to apologle for this negligence through excuses, then it Is not difficult to condradict these lame explanations. We know here to our surprise from the mouths of foreign statesmen the intention for fulfillment existed, but the time for doing so had not yet come. But how? All conditions for disarmament of other states existed at that time without exception. Germany had disarmed. . . . Politically, too, the conditions were ripe, for Germany was then a democracy if ever there was one. Everything was copied exactly and was dutifully likened to its existing great models. . . . The time was ripe but the world was nonexistent. ... Not only have these other states net disarmed, but to the contrary they have in the most extraordinary manner completed, improved and thereby increased their armaments. The objection has no weight In that connection that partial limitation of personnel has taken place. For this personnel limitation is more than equalized by technical and planned improvement of the most modem weapons of war. Besides this limitation could very easily at any time be caught up with . . . Germany Defenseless Germany had destroyed all her airplares. Germany became not only defenseless as regards active aerial weapons but also defenseless as regards the passive means of air protection. During the same time, however, not only did the contracting parties fail to destroy existing planes but to the contrary, continued to develop them extraordinarily . . . Instead of destroying existing bombing planes as did Germany these were most industrially improved, developed and replaced by ever larger and more complete types . . . The number of flying fields and airdromes was not only not reduced, but everywhere Increased. Warships were equipped with airplanes . . . Germany In accordance with the obligations imposed upon her destroyed her World War tanks. Thereby she also, - true to the treaty, destroyed and scrapped an offensive weapon. It would have been the duty of other states on their part to begin destroying their tanks. However, not only did they fail to destroy them but they continuously improved them, both as regards speed and their ability to resist attack. The speed of the World War tanks, four to 12 kilometres, increased to 30, 40, 50, and' finally 160 kilometres an hour. . . . Within the same time in which Germany destroyed her tanks and waited for the fulfilment of the destruction of the others, these others built over 30.000 new tanks and Improved and enlarged them into ever more terrible weapons. ... Germany had to destroy her entire heavy artillery according to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. This was done too! But while Germany's howitzers and cannons were cut by blow-torches and went in as scrap iron to the blast furnaces, the other treaty partners not only failed to destroy their heavy artillery but. on the contrary even, there followed constructive development, improvement and perfection. . . . Gas Weapons Gas weapons: As a prerequisite for a disarmament treaty the partners of Germany had her destroy her entire gas weapons according to the Versailles Treaty, and she did it. In other states the people were busy in chemical laboratories, not to scrap this weapon, but to the contrary, to improving it in an unheard of manner. . . . Submarines: Here too, Germany has faithfully fulfilled her obligations in accordance with the letter of Versailles to make possible international disarmament. . . . The world about her not only has not followed this example, has not even merely preserved her stock left over from the war, but on the contrary, has constantly completed, improved and ir creased it. The increase in displacement was finally augmented to a 3.000-ton boat. Armaments increased to 20 centimetre cannon. . . . This then was the contribution to disarmament on the part of states who in the Versailles Treaty obliged themselves, on their part, to follow the German example and destroy the submarine weapon. If all this isn't an open breach of the treaty and a onesided one at that, coming as it does after the other partner had without exception fulfilled his obligation, it will be difficult to see Iiow in the future the signing of treaties can have any meaning whatsoever. No: For this there is no extenuation, no excuse! For Germany with her complete defenselessness was anything but a danger to other states. Although Germany waited In vain for years for the other side to make good its obligations under the treaty Germany nevertheless was ready still not to withhold her hand for a real collective co-operation effort. . . . It was not Germany that made the plan for a 200,000 men army for all European states impossible of realization, but it was the other states that did not want to disarm. ... Offered Plans The hope sometimes Is expressed nowadays that Germany might herself advance a constructive plan. Well, I have made such proposals not once but repeatedly. Had my constructive plan for a 300.000-man army been accepted perhaps many a worry today would be less onerous, many a load lighter. But there is almost no purpose in proposing constructive plans if their rejection can be regarded as certain to begin with. If nevertheless, I decide to give an outline of our ideas, I do it merely from a feeling of duty not to leave anything untried that might restore to Europe the necessary inner security, and to European peoples the feelings of solidarity. Inasmuch as hitherto not only the fulfilment of the obligations of other states to disarm had failed to materialize, but also all proposals for limitation of armaments had been rejected, I as leader of the German nation, considered myself obligated before God and my conscience, in view of the formation of new military alliances and after receipt of notification that France was proceeding to the introduction of the two-year term of service, now to re-establish Germany's equality which had been internationally denied her. ... It was not Germany who thereby broke the obligation laid on her but those states which compelled us to undertake this Independent action. . I cannot refrain here from expressing my astonishment at the definition by the British Premier MacDonald who, referring to the restoration of the German army opined that the other states, after all had been right in holding back their disarmament. If such ideas are to be generally accepted, what is to be expected from the future? For according to this, every breach of the treaty will find later justification by the assumption the other party will probably break the treaty too. . . . Disputes Argument It Is said Germany is threatened by nobody, there's no reason why Germany should rearm at all. Why did not the others then disarm? From disarmed Germany they had nothing to fear. There is only the choice of two things either armaments are a menace to peace, then they are that in the case of all countries. If armaments are not a menace to peace, then that applies the same way. It will not be for one group of states to represent their armaments as an olive branch and the other armaments as the scourge of the devil. A tank is a tank, a bomb is a bomb. . . . Germany refuses to be regarded and treated for all time as a second class or inferior nation. Our love of peace perhaps is greater than in the case of others, for we have suffered most from war. None of us want to threaten anybody, but we all are determined to obtain the security and equality of our people. And this equality is the first condition for practical collective co-operation. . . . With mental reservations European co-operation is impossible. With equality Germany will never refuse to do its share of every endeavor which serves peace, progress and the general welfare. At this point I cannot withhold criticism of certain methods which were responsible for the failure of many well-meant ff vC- sWv w? J'-'Xvva ?! 5s t eft ''IftMCXJljJUKjWrr ' lis ' FORD 90-H.P. 2-TON TRUCK The truck for heavy-duty truckers and haulers. The 90-horse-power truck-type engine has all the new Ford V-8 engine features including crankcase ventilation and copper-lead connecting-rod bearings. All Ford Truck units have four-speed transmission with standard S.A.E. power take-off opening and the famous full-floating rear axle with straddle-mounted pinion. Probably no other single feature of any truck is quite so important to operators as this remarkable Ford Truck rear axle. Your Ford dealer will gladly let you make your own tests with this or the IWton truck. -t "4a 1 a efforts because they were conceived in the spirit of Versailles. . . . We are living in the age of conferences. So many ended fialures because often their programs were a vaguely formulated mixture of possible and impossible aims in which the wish which is father to the thought seems to play a role. Then when two or three states agree to a program others invited to join later are told this program is an indivisible whole and must be accepted or rejected as such. Inasmuch as in such a program naturally very good ideas can also be found the state not agreeing to the entire draft assumes the responsibility of failure also of the useful part. This procedure reminds one very strongly of the practice of certain film distributors who, on principle, will give good and bad films only when they are joined together Such procedure is understandable only as a last atavistic phenomenon that roots in the model of the so-called peace negotiations of Versailles Announces Stand As far as Germany is concerned, I can only say the following in reply to such attempts: : We shall in the future take part in no conference in the formation of whose program we have not participated from the beginning. We do not propose, when two states concoct a pact dish, as a third party to be the first to taste that dish. I do not mean to say by that we won't reserve to ourselves the right afterwards to agree to treaties and affix our signature to them because we were not present when they were formulated or when conferences were held concerning them. Certainly not. It is well possible that a treaty, although we did not participate in its formulation or the conference which gave its effect for a number of states, nevertheless in its final language may be agreeable to us and seem useful to us We must re-emphaslze, however, the method seems to me to be wrong to offer drafts of programs if I I f f IS J ?Jiy gesil jMa flUne tmnnafl yrm miQedi : ,-yr. xm-'n,vT.iwiiii "'hhiiiwiiimi yimilii in . . tevw jWibwi. r-ifn 11 wiia, t ' . . iv n ,,, 1 " ''""""iKmmmimmmmmmittiii tMiimmmtmnmnmmimimamiaMi &r r--- f-. "g- .,-,.. ..l.vi.....lAA,,,,,,,.,1,ir for conferences that bear the superscription 'everything or nothing.' I consider such a principle impracticable for political life. I believe much more would have been accomplished for the pacification of Europe If there had been a readiness to have been satisfied with what could be achieved from case to case. Hardly a proposal for a pact has been offered for discussion during recent years, at which one or other points might not have been generally accepted without further ado. By tying up this point, however, with other points which were partly more difficult, partly or entirely unacceptable to individual states, good things were left undone and the whole thing failed. To me it seems a risky thing to misuse the indivisibility of peace as a pretext for proceedings which serve collective security less than collective preparations for war, intentionally or unintentionally. The World War should be a cry of warning here. Not for a second time can Europe survive such a catastrophe. But such a catastrophe may happen all the more easily, the more a network of crisscross international obligations makes the localization of a small conflict impossible, increases the danger of states being dragged in. Pledge to France Germany has solemnly guaranteed France her present frontiers, resigning: herself to the permanent loss of Alsace-Lorraine. She has made a treaty with Poland and we hope it will be renewed and renewed again at every expiry of the set period. We want to spare the German people all bloodshed but we will not spill any of our blood for foreign interests or risk It In pacts of assistance of which one cannot foresee the end. There are certain things that are , K , " ' fin . iM K ,swwwwwc,s't yfi WMEM, possible and others that are Impossible. As an example, I would like to refer briefly 'to the eastern pact suggested to us. We found in it an obligation for assistance which we are convinced can lead to consequences that simply cannot be measured. The German Reich, especially the present German Government, had no other w-ish except to live on terms of peace and friendship with all neighboring states. . . . Much as we ourselves love peace it is not within our power to prevent the outbreak of conflicts between states, especially in the east. To determine who Is guilty is infinitely difficult itself in such a case. . . . Once the fury 'of war rages among peoples, the end begins to justify every means. ... I fear at the beginning of such a conflict an obligation for assistance will be less calculated to lead the way for recognizing who Is the attacking body than it will to support the state that Is useful to one's own interests. Aside from these considerations of a fundamental nature we have here to deal with a special case. The Germany of today is a National Socialist state. The ideaology that dominates us is in diametrical con-tradition to that of Soviet Russia. National Socialism is a doctrine that has reference exclusively to the German people. Bolshevism lays stress on its international mission. Theory of Party We National Socialists believe a man can in the long run, be happy only among his own. people. We are convinced the happiness and achievements of Europe are in-dissolubly tied up with the continuation of the system of independent and free national states. Bolshevism preaches the establishment of a world empire and recognizes only sections of a central International. . . . Bolshevism destroys not only private property but also private initiative and the readiness to shoulder responsibility. It has not been able to save millions of human ",1K lillfl aEEanacgG aim FORD OO-H.P. II2-TON TRUCK Ford V-8 Trucks are built to full truck specifications. They are not adaptations of passenger-car construction. They hare the burly power and endurance which make truck buyers, who are in the market for new equipment, give the Ford V-8 line early and earnest consideration. The IVrtoh truck has, like the 2-ton unit, the new-quick-stop ping brakes, new lower pedal pressure clutch, new high-efficiency cooling system and the proved performance of the 80-horsepower Ford V-8 engine. The Ford V-8 is the most economical Ford ever built. The V-8 Load :..ami... m4. .." Wc. v.- ft s v beings from starvation in Russia, the greatest agrarian state in the world. . . . National Socialists and Bolshevists both are convinced they are a world apart from each other and their differences can never be bridged. Apart from that there were thousands of vui I'j'ii. niui ii .im iziAiilll u ill the fight against Bolshevism. If Russia likes Bolshevism it is not our affair, but if Bolshevism casts its nets over Germany, then we fight it tooth and nail. The fact remains Bolshevism feels and acts as a world revolutionary idea and movement. Prominent Bolshevist statesmen and Bolshevist literature have admitted it proudly. If I am not mistaken, the British keeper of the privy seal's impression is the Soviets are entirely averse to aggressive military intention. Nobody would be happier than we if this impression should prove correct in the future. But the past speaks against it. . . . I started my movement Just at the time when Bolshevism registered its first victories in this country. After 15 years the Bolshevists number six millions; my movement 13 millions. We have beaten them and saved Germany, perhaps all of Europe from the most terrible catastrophe of all times. . . . Germany has nothing to gain from a European war. What we want is liberty and independence. Because of these Intentions of ours we were also ready to negotiate non-aggression pacts with all our neighbor states. If we except Lithuania, this is not due to tha fact we desire war there, but because we cannot enter Into political treaties with a state which disregards the most primitive laws of human society. It is sad enough that because CONTINUED ON PAGE TEN THIS SECTION iv O O 157-inch. 2-ton heavy-truck with stake body has load space of 132"x78"x42". mVrinch, iy2-ton Ford ; Truck with panel body space is lll"x55v57Vg" '' ""I 41 1

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