The National Tribune from Washington, District of Columbia • Page 1

fllky4K 4 -TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS, St to ESTABLISHED lS77-tfEW SERIES. WASHINGTON. D. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1S89. VOL IX-NO.

20-WHOLE NO. 436. XC STOpFACAipEER Reminiscences of a Detached Volunteer in a Regular Battery. GRIFFIN'S OLD BATTERY. The First Day's Battle in the Wilderness.

"ROUGH AND TUMBLE." Bushwhacking on a Tremendous Scale. ToorraianT, 1SSS.1 XL HE Artillery Brigade of the new Fifth Corps consisted of eight batteries, being those of the old First and Fifth together, of which six were volunteer nnd two Regular. The Regular batteries were ours and Ri lien-house's (D of the 5th IT. the latter being the one that Captain Hazlett had been killed in command of at Gettsj'burg. The Chief of Artillery of the Corps was Gen.

Walnwright, who had held the same position in the old First Corps. The volunteer batteries were Martin's and Phillips's (Massachusetts), Winslow's, Breck's and Mink's (New Yorkers), and Cooper's old 1st Pennsylvania. Of theseBreck'sand Cooper's liad been with us in the old First Corps, Breck's being the battery that had formerly been known as Reynolds's. Mink's had also joined the First Corps after Gettysburg. The two Maine batteries thai had been with us in the First Corps Hall's 2d-and Stevens's 5th bad not come into the new Fifth Corps, but had been transferred; Hall's to the Ninth Corps, as well as I can recollect, End Stevens's, which had been home during the "Winter to had been put into the Reserve Artillery.

Wc were sorry to Iwe Stevens's battery, because it had been shoulder to shoulder or, as artillerymen say, "hub to hub" with us for nearly two yean and was one of the very best volunteer batteries in the army. It had no superior, sod bat few equals, Regular or volunteer. A dose fellowship always prevailed between the battorymen of an artillery brigade, similar to that between companies in the same regiment. They -were always camped together at or near corns head quarters, and were commanded by a Chief of I Artillery, who reported directly to and received orders direct from the corps commander. In the old First Corps, ours had been the only Regular battery in the Artillery Brigade, but now RittenhonseT6 (D of the 5th u.

was with us. This was a diBtiogaisbcd battery. It was Griffin's old battery, and onjoyed the rare distinction of having been in action at the first Bull Run. It had done yeoman service in the Penin-BBlar campaign tinder CapL Kingsbury, where it had been mentioned in nearly every battle report. Its men always claimed that TIIEY HAD CAPTUKED THE FLAG of an Alabama regiment in one of the Seven DayV betllee in front of Richmond, but that it had been stolen by the infantry regiment that wae sepporting them, and the infantry received credit for it in the official reports.

Their atory wag that they were charged by ibte Alabama regiment and broke it all to pieces with their canister about 100 feet from their muzzles, the remnants fleeing in Bach con fusion that they left their colors lying on the ground in front of Battery D. Bat same of the infantry, who were lying d'tvrn in line with thorn, ran out and picked np this flag and then claimed it as their own capture, though they had not pnlled a trigger, and the rebel charge had been repulsed by the battery alone. If Battery had been properly credited with the capture of this stand of colors it would have been a unique distinction, as there wae no similar case recorded on either side during the whole war. This battery had also been desperately engaged at Gettysburg, where it defended Little Round Top the second day, losing it Captain (Hazlett), killed, and about 30 men killed and wounded. In fact, Hazl elt's, CusMng's and ours topped the record of battery casualties at Gettysburg; ours exceeding oithor of them by two or three.

Ritierlhouse's battery was a very fine organization. It was manned, the same as ours, largely by detached volunteers, but mainly New Yorkers and Ponnsylvanians, while ours were mostly Western men from Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan, with only a few ew Yorkers. Its esprit du corps ran very high, and a sharp rivalry naturally eprung up between them and us. It wae however, A GENEROUS AND GOOD-NATURED RIVALRY, never resulting, so far as I can remember, in any personal difficulties; though I recollect one or two debates about the prowess of our respective batteries which were pretty animated. At this time (May, 18G4,) Battery had doubtless been in a greater number of actions than Stewart's had; but I do not wnnK it nad ever faced such "music by the nii uAit rosarw 7 uvuMmrS road Cut, excepting of course.

Hip. Firf. Run, where it was nearly destroyed, as to its personnel, and lost all its gnns. It was in a pretty hot place on Little Round Top at Gettysburg also. Its principal laurels up to this time had been won in the Peninsular campaign, where it belonged to Filz-John I Cfc Porter's Corps, and was held by that corps in much the same estimation as Stewart's battery was held by tho old First Corps.

But with all tho record of Griffin's battery, I maintain that there was nothing in its history to compare with the terrific and almost incredible fight that OldB made in front of the Cornfield at Autietam, which statement is equally true of every other battery in the army. They were armed with the 10-pounder Parrotts; which I always considered inferior Too Many Guns for a Baggage Train. to the three-inch rifle. The Parrotts were made on a bad plan, being of cast-iron, with a wrought-iron baud shrunk on over the breech. They frequently broke off just forward of this reinforce, and sometimes blew up with fatal results to their Cannoneers.

But I never knew 12-poundcr Napoleon or a three-inch wrought-iron rifle to blow up. I used to think that if any thing could make me take the chances of desertion it would be an assigument to a Parrott battery 1 However, Griffin's boys managed to get great deal of glory out of those abominable old Parrott guns they had from Bull Run to Appomattox, under Griffin himself, or Kingsbury, or Hazlett, or Rittenhonse, or Rawles, one time or another. Later than this period Battery of the Fifth was consolidated with this celebrated Battery and as this consolidation made a surplus of a few men, while our battery was short, four or five of Griffin's veterans were transferred to our battery Crocker, Bennett, and two or three more whom I cannot remember. They were all daisies." I wish I could remember more nbout Griffin's battery, because I was Griffin's Orderly in the latter part of the war, when he was a Major-Genornl, and got very fond of him, ns everybody did who ever came near him. lie has been dead many years, and 1 know that I could do nothing that would please him more, if alive, than to write the deeds of his battery.

I am sorry that I remember so little about it. But I recollect one thing which may be of interest to any surviving members of Griffin's battery. After the consolidation of the old First and old Fifth Corps into the new Fifth, which brought the two Artillery Brigades into one, old "Jock" Stewart used to say: "Now, my fine boys, you've got a rival. You can't fool with this old Regular battery of Griffin's a bitl Remember, your Captain Gibbon is a General the game as theirs" Griffin, Tin's was a powerful appeal to us. It was a singular circumstance.

Hero were two Regular batteriesthe only ones of the Artillery Brigade of the Fifth Corps of the Fourth and of the Fifth. On the Regular Army list, John Gibbon was still Captain of Battery while diaries Griffin held the same relation to UaticryD; but both batteries were actually commanded by their Lieutenants, while the two Captains were both Mnjor-Generals of Volunteers Griffin commanding a division in our own corps, and Gibbon a division in the Second Corps, and both afterward commanding army corps. Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that there must have been a sharp rivalry' betweeu two such batteries, each having a brilliant record of its own. 1 remember now the names of hut very few of the men in Griffin's old battery. The officers I recollect are Ritleuhouse, Van Reed and Rawles.

Of the men, I can recall only Orderly-Serg't Broderick, a tall, fine-looking Irish soldier; Serg't Grady, aud a few of the Cannoneers Crocker, Hyatt, and two or three more. But I find that my recollection of details of all kinds in 1801, when I was a veteran, is much less vivid than in 1802 and 1803, when I was a new recruit. Rittenhouso and Stewart were warm friends, having a common bond of sympathy in that neither of them was a West Pointer; the Old Man having been promoted from the ranks, as before related, and Rittenhouso having been appointed from civil life upon the organization of the 5th Art in 160L We could always see that there was something lacking in the behavior of West Point-era toward rankers, or officers appointed from civil life. They would bo courteous enough and all that, but it was plain that they considered themselves superior beings, and their manner toward those who had not been "anointed" at the Military Academy was supercilious and patronizing sometimes in a painful degree. The unpopularity of West Pointers in our battery, amounting almost to hatred, was due to the fierce resentment of our men at what they considered unfair or "patronizing" treatment of the Old Man by West Point officers on some occasions.

It -was true that Stewart had not enini -oimuuKraui nuerai education in earlv ability, big brain, the advantages of liberal education In early "-Wive, generous, honest heart amply made i tt a 3P for it He yielded to no West Pointer in Curtesy or any other attribute of a and so far aa hia character ae the commander of a fighting battery was concerned, they all had to yield to him. As for the volunteer batteries of the old Fifth Corps, now merged in the Artillery Brigado of thoncw Fifth Martin's, Phillips's and Winslow's they were all first-class, aud quito worthy to bo in auch distinguished company. Mink's battery, which had been put in the old First Corps aftor Gettysburg, I always considered the best of tho volunteer batteries in the new Fifth Corps. Itwna Battery of tho 1st N. Y.

Its Captain, "Charley" Mink, ns his men used to call him, was (lashing, handsome young officer, of Irish descent, I beliove; bravo in battlo and jovial in camp. Ho was a primo favorite with his men with whom wo Regulars nsed to think ho was sometimes pretty lax in mntlers of discipline, and among tho other officers ho was very popular, by rea-Bon of his comical wit, his irrepressible good humor, nnd his unbounded hospitality. Tho officers of the Artillery Brigado need to have old times when they got a chance, and on those occasions Charley Mink always "kept his end up," and generally a little ahead. His men wcro good soldiers and served their guns superbly, but thoy wcro rather a Cough lot, nnd sometimes quarrelsome. Our battery, having been recruited up during the Winter, had a larger complement than at any previous time since the Spring of 1803.

As near ns Pcnn recollect, wo had 114 or 110 enlisted men, with threo commissioned officers Capt. Stewart commanding, and Lieuts. Mitchell and Goodman. Prior to this, wo had never had more than 00 or 05 men and two officers present. With this organization tho new Fifth Corps was said to bo 27,000 strong infantry and artillery.

Its commander, Gen. Gouver-neur K. Warren, was one of tho noblest men that ever lived. Ho was not only a most accomplished officer and bravo soldier. but kind hearted as well, and it was to be said of him which unfortunately could not always be said of Generals that he never forgot that private soldiers wcro men, and that thoy had feelings and spirits quite nB acute nnd sensitive us those who wore shoulder-straps.

The veterans of tho old First Corps did not at the start rclith tho idea of the organization thoy had made so famous being wiped out of existence, but thoy soon got accustomed to this new situation, and after a fight or two vied with their comrades of the old Fifth in esprit du corps. I noticed when I got bnck to tho army a new style of discipline, or rather a new state of feeling among tho men. Things were more strict and methods more regular among tho volunteers. In fact, tho whole army had become like Regulars. Old Grant hud made a profound impression on the rank and file.

Tho eclat of his great achievements in tho West, his plain, uniusumiug appearance, his habit of going around among tho camps (tc qucntly, nnd nbovc all the rumors that ho was occasionally subject to the besetting frailty of tho soldier, all tended to populur-ize him with the men. I also observed that there was different method of estimating the enemy in vogue. When I first joined the Army of tho Potomac the habit was to exaggerate the strength of Leo's army. As soldiers always got their impresflionB on such matters from their officers, it is apparent that it must havo been the policy of tho earlier commandurs of the Army of the Potomac to exaggerate tho numbers of the enemy, with a view, no doubt, to explain their frequent defeats or to excuse the butcheries that resulted from their incompetency. liUT NOW ALL THIS WAS CHANGED.

We men in the wcro informed thai tho rebel nrmy, though still strong no doubt, find very desperate, was inferior to tin in numbers and equipment, and that wo woro expected to wind up Its career that Summer. Iroay say here that long after the war In fact, after ho had loft tho Presidential chair I had a talk with Gen. Grant about this mat ter. He told mo that ho took pains to havo tho troops correctly Informed aa to the strength ivn bctv Old Grant "Fighting Tniar Over." and equipment of tho enemy; that when tho armycrosKcd tho Rapldan ho know very nearly how many men Leo had and what their condl-Hon was; that tho only mlatakoho made waa in supposing that Plckott'a Division was present with Longstrect'a Corps at Gordonsvillo which ho suld waa a natural supposition, aa Spring had opened, and tho Confederate commander could not help knowing that our army would soon attack him, nnd, therofore, ho would ho likely to have all his troops present. 80 Gen.

Grant Bald ho took palna to havo hia men Informed that tho enemy was inferior to them. 11a said it wbb Hulcidal for a commander to exaggerate tho forco of tho enemy; that It tended to depress tho spirits of tho troops; that it was tho best policy, particularly with so Intelligent a body of men as tho Army of tho Potomac was, to let them know tho exact truth as near as it could ho ascertained, so that thoy might know approximately tho work that was cot out for them, and nervo thomselvos to its proper performance. Gen. Grant on this occasion added that whilo ho knew that Leo'a array was In- rcrlor to oura In numbors and equipment ho did not underrate tho terrific fighting power that thoy still possessed, nor tho vast ad van tago which thoy derived from tho faet that thoy wero fighting on tholr own soil, among a friendly populace, and, above all, with an iutiraato personal knowledge of roads, fords, etc, which our commaudera could only got by reconnolssances or from maps, which were often defective. Ho told mo also that, as matter of preference, ho did not want to fight a great battlo in tho tangled underbrush of tho Wildor- 1 'Atr K' A Will- "5BaBBar no83, hut hoped to got out Into tho moro open country south or Spottfiylvanln hoforo Leo could striko tho Hunk of bis column.

Still, ho said, ho know ho would have to rraiiT in Tin: if Loo moved against hi flank promptly, which wah chnnco ho hud to and for which ho was prepared but that ifo rutlicr oxpoutcd that Locwhou ho saw tho Army of tho Potomac moving to cross tlio'Kapidnn by tho moro easterly fords, would push tat from Orango Courthouse nnd Utmlonsvillo by tho roads following Rouurally the north bank of tho North Anna River, with a viovv to tho protection of tho Virginia Central nnd Richmond Fredericksburg Railroads from that; position. This, Gen. Grant said, would havo been Leo's true Blatogy if ho had foltsuro of thostrongth of his army to moot the Army of tho Potomac in tho OJKll), Ho (Gen. Grant) had studied tho wholo situation carefully, and Bowhou ho saw Loo moving rapidly by tho piko and plank roads to striko him in tho Wilderuoss, it proved to him that Leo was scnsiblo of tho comparative weakness of his forco, aud honco, liko tho great Con-oral ho was, ho sought to make up for Itis nu-murical inferiority by forcing a tighten ground liko tho Wildoruoss, Whore superiority of numhora and equipment would hoof least value. Gon.

Grant said ho know that tho Confedoroto onny could bo conquorod only by destroying it, mm nence no oosirou, 11 posaiblo, to draw it out Into open country whero ho could got tho most boucfltof his superior numbers in assaulting or outflanking its positions, ns occasion might require. Uut ho said ho was not wholly master of tho situation that his army could movoonly a certain distance per day; and that if Lot: moved rapidly enough to strike his flank beforo ho could got clear of the Wilderness, of coiuso ho would havo to fight thcro. It was, ho said, a contingency which ho wanted to avoid If ho could, but which ho was prepared to mako tho heat of, if it was forced on him which was the case. This conversation took place in Gon. Grant's oflico in tho First National Hank building in.w York, when ho was, I think, President of tho Mexican Central Hail road Co.

Ho was in. flno spirits that day. Tho Hon. Thomas ifurphy was present during part of tho Interview, but loft, saying that when Gun. Grant could gcta chance to fight tho war over again with an Old private soldier, who had aorved undor his commaud, thcro was no end to him.

In conclusion, Gon. Grant, after musing awhile, remarked: "Woll, Gou. Lee did what OM3A.T AND PnUDKHT COMMANDKH would have dono there, couslduring tho state of his army at thu thno. and Its rolatlvo inferiority to mlno; but I do not think that ho accomplished as much as ho oxpectod. Ho inflicted great losses on my forco, and suffered much less himself ia the; aggregate, but proportionately he was worjji crippled In tho Wilderness and atSpottsylvauin than 1 was.

"I think on tho wholo that ho would havo dono better if ho had fallun rapidly back on Richmond, manned tho utrong works there with his nrmy intact, and watted for tho assault which, under such circumstances, wo should cortainly havo delivered, lu that cago my army would havo ronohed Richmond in a condition of dash and exaltation that would havo compelled its commander to order an asi-sault, ihosuuio as tho fcvliug of my army at Vickaburg compelled nio io assault that place before they would consent to tho hard work and privations of a siege. It is douhtkss best aa It waa," True, tho ahovo is a long digression and rather foreign to tho main purpose of this sketch, which is to'glvo tho RiiKlnisccnwfl of a Cannoneer' during thowarnd not his experience afterward. Uujk nut I havo novor seen tho above-mentioned tflcvrs 0f Gon. Grant published any where not oven In his book, with so much detail I trust tbudlgrcsdon WHI bo pardoned, In view of its application to tho sub-jeet-mnttor of (ho sketch. At 1 o'clock in tho morning of May 4 wo mounted and filed out on tho Stevonshurg plank road on tho march for Gormania Ford.

no nrnvcn at 1110 vicinity oi ino lord about dnyllght, but had towajc noma timo for Wil- SOU Cavalrv Division in pw llm lumlMn bridges, aud wo utllizod thin timo In making coflVo and breakfasting. Whilo halted hero a funny Incident occurred. Strict oiders had been Issued that no knapsacks or bundles wcro to bo strapped on to nuy part of tho gun-car-rlages, but that cvorythlnneccasary should bo carried on tho caissons and battery-wagons. Rut 0110 of our batteries had considerable stufr strapped on, contrary to orders; so when Gon. Watnwrlgbt came along as wo woro halted in column In tho road, he noticed this.

A Liou-tonaut was at that moment In command. Gen. Wainwright rofntil up hj horso, looked at tho battery, mid "Lieutenant, what Is this you havo horc?" "Why, General, this Is Uattcry "Ah, thank you for the information, Lieutenant; couldn't quite make it out. You carry too many guns for it haggitgc-train, and too much baggage for a battery With this tho old Gonial rodo dh, leaving all tho tn on roarlntr w5f.li iiwirrlnwuit. tt.

needless to remark that the rf'Homblaucoqf that battery to a baggago-tralu soon ceased. FINALLY TUB CAVALRY: GOT ACROSS and wo moved close at their hools. Porhaps It was o'clock In tho morning of May when our old battery pulled up froumho pontoon bridge, ami after halting for somo time to let Wiida-worth's Infantry tllo past, wo again moved forwardforward, as It proved, to begin within 21 hours a campaign without parallel in tho annals of war; a campaign In which two great armies marched aud fought for 11 mouths from Miiy 5, 1804. to Anrii 0. lfifis wftim.ih over being out of gunshot.

Tho immediate conlllcfc in which wo woro so soon to engage proved to ho also unique in history. It iu beat described aa bno solid battlo from the 6th of May to tho 3d of Juno, Inclusive, and from tho Rapldan to tho Chlokahomlny. Tho two veteran arinlos grappled each other liko two hugo bull-dogs, hung to each other for 30 days, literally rolling over and over tor a hundred miles, and chawing each other's throats all tho way. A campaign host described by drawing a broad crimson slripo right across tho map of Virginia from thu Raplduu to tho Appomattox. Tho Army of tho Potomac, as It now stood on the south bank of tho Rapldan, stripped for battlo, wan at Its zonilh.as on organization.

Its officers, without oxc6ptton, woro oxpori-onccd In warfare. Ita rank and file woro largely veterans, many of whom had Just ro-enlisted after threo yours service, and woro inured to battlo, fatfguojand privation. Its commandor Grant had come to it with tho prostlgo of an unbroken record of victories in tho West. And though all the Potomac votorans know that Loo's Army of Northern Virginia was an altogothordttreront Institution from tho Western armies that Grant had beaten or captured, still wo fylbtlmt tho Army of tho Potomac was also a moro compact and bottor-trofued fighting forco than tho Western Federal armies that Grant had commanded, and so wo thought that would even things up. At all events, Grant's reputation was that of a commander who always fought his battles to tho finish and that was the kind of Qonoral tho old Army of tho Potomac had wanted for threo 7Jng years.

It is needless to say that thoy woro not disappointed in Grant. Tho long rest of fivo months iu tho Winter camps of tho Itapidan had uuido tho men anxious for tho ex citement 01 an actlvo campaign, Thoy know umi, mo renoi army was inferior to thorn in number and equlpmont And I boliovo that I oxprcaa what was thon tho almost unanimous opinion of tho rank and file when I say that thoy woro perfectly confident that this was to bo tho last campaign; of tho war, and that it wouldn't last long, either. In a word, tho morale of our army was very high, and though its subsequent experience showed that tho rebel army was A HARDER NUT TO, CIUCJC THAN WB still thoro was never an hour from May 5, 1804, to April 9, 180D, wheu tho rauk and file of tha Army of tho Potomac doubted tholr own mastery of tho situation, or rognrded tho destruction of tlioir antagonist as anything but a question of tlmp, Well, undbr sifch circumstances, tho Fifth Corps moved down tho Gormnnla road during tho afternoon of tho 4th of May, and halted along that road from tho Wilderuww Tavern hack to a farmhouso called, I boliovo, Spottswood'o. Tho difl'oront batteries had been ordorcd that morning to roport to tho division commanders two to each division and wo c- Out oif tub Wilderness." wcro assigned to Wadsworth's Division, which brought us onco moro shoulder to shouldor with the old Iron Brigado and tho other troops of tho old First Corps. Toward ovoning on tho 4th of May wo heard faintly iu tho West occasional crackling volloys, Which, to our practiced ears, suggested cavalry skirmishing, an wo know that Wilson's Division had gono in that direction beforo wo camo up.

Somo of tho men thought that Wilson's cavalry had found Loo's flankors, which would indicate that tho main rebel army was moving to the southward to head n3 off somewhere down bolow. Uut tho others oxprcssd tho opinion that, tho cavalry had oncountcrcd the advaneo skirmishers of the enemy moving straight toward us on tho piko and plank roads, and if this was bo wo know it meant a great battlo right whero wo woro. It turned out to bo so. Ilowovor, wo passed tho night very comfortably, aud stood to posts in tho morning just boforo daybreak. I supposo it wag about sunrise when Wadsworth's Division began to deploy out through tho fields aud brush on tho south sldo of tho piko, WHILK WK WENT INTO BATTERY on a high knoll beyond tho Laccy House, whoro wn could ciifilado tho piko in ono direction or tako the cdglo.of the woods to tho loft on ocharpe, as nln'limshilirni mltrlit rnntitrn.

Wadsworth's men disappeared in tho woods just mentioned, nnd had gono but a fow minutes when, farther to the loft, whero Crawford was with tho Pennsylvania Uesorvcs, thoro came tho terrific crash of two main lines of battlo opening together, and wo alt instantly realized that tho battlo of tho Wilderness had begun 2 Wo moved out from tho Gormania road early In tho morning of tho 5th of May, following the Infantry of Wadsworth's Division, passed through (hbiLacoy clearing and through tho brush by a wood road until wo cameto tho opn ground of llagerson's clearing, whero wo halted on the north bank of a Httlo stronm which wo culled the Wtldornos Urook, or Run. Wadsworth's Infantry struck tho main robel lino of battlo at and abovo Jlngersou's house, but tho conflict was of short duration, as Crawford's Division, further to ourloft, gavo way, exposing Wadsworth's ilauk, so that tho latter retreated rapidly, though in order, back to tho brush. As It was ovidently tho iutcntion to abandon this advanced lino wo did not unlimber. Wit retreated with tho infantry by tho samo road on which wo had advanced. Wo could not understand why wo fell back thero without firing a Bhor, but supposed it was because tho advance of tho Fifth Corps had not been properly supported.

Having fallen back, wo wont into position near tho Lacey JIouso, and remained thcro during tho day, not engaged. But tho infautry fighting in our front and to tho loft of us, in tho low scrubby woods and beyond them, was frightful. All wo paw of this first day in tho Wilderness was tho awful procession of mangled iuuu ent uacii 10 1110 wilderness Tavern, nnd other points on tho Gormania road, from tho infantry divisions of Griffin, Bobinson, Wads-worth and Crawford, of tho Fifth Corps, Occasional spent balls from ovortho woods kicked up tho dust near us. but nobody was hurt. Artillery was not much used on our front this day.

Almost all tho work was dono by tho infantry iu a sort of a UOUGII-AND-TTJMnLE FASHION, catch as catch can, nnd wo couldn't mako head nor tall of It from tho sound, which was a pretty nearly solid crash of miiBkotry from daylight till dark. Thcro was comparative rest after 9 o'clock, but tho slighlly-woundod stragglers from tho Infantry iu our front kopt coming back through our position moro or less all night. Tho only battery in tho Arttllory Brigndo of thol'ifth Corps seriously ongaged this first day in tho Wilderness was Wluslow'a (D, 1st N.Y.), which was with Grlilln's Division on tho piko. Thoy had a section, which wits pushed out on tho Tllko closo till to tlm nimnnr niwl Ayres's Brigado foil back thoy wero caught in tho flank by tho onumy coming in on tho north sldo of tho road. As woll as I can recollect, Bartlctt mado an effort to rotako theso guns, hut bolng unsupported by Ay res on his right, and tho ouomy threatening to got iu on his loft rear, ho was unablo to accomplish his purpose Conso-quently, this section of Winslow's battery was lost, and though tho two gnus romaiuod thoro in tho road iu plain sight tho rest of tho day, tho enemy succeeded in hauling them off during tho night.

Winslow's loss In moii was oight or 10 and all tho horsos of this section. No men woro hurt in tho other batteries, ox-cept Coopor'a, which was also involved to somo oxtont on Griffin's front, aud may havo lost a man or two and somo horses. Tho wholo tronhlo on Grlfiln's front seemed to bo. b'o far OB tho UrtillOTV OtlPmrml 111 urn urn a snt. 1 that tho batteries woro thrown out or sections from them as a Bort of halt to tho onomy to mako him dovolop.

Thoy could do littlo or nothing except to tiro along tho piko Itself, aud that was Inoflectual, because tho ouemy brought no artillery to oppose thorn, but defiled his infantry through tho brush on tholr flanks, aud bo caught thorn In holplesa positions, whou Ayrcs rooollod. No blamo whutevor could attach to Capt. Winslow for tho loss of his section. In fact, ho hlmsolf was sovoroly wounded In a gallant but vain attempt to rescuo his guus after tho Infantry had broken. His battery was afterwurda commandod by Lieut.

Richardson. It la not for mo to criticize tactical operations on a largo scalo, because from my humblo station I could havo but meager opportunities of seeing tho ground nnd observing tho situations of tho troona: bnfc nnfc nnWl l.nt-.. othor battcryman lu the Fifth Corps Artillory "i vo uuu uoc oeou nauuieu with anything liko adequate ofl'oct that first day in tho Wildornoss. Thoro was no reason why tho 48 guns of tho brigade should not havo boon formed on tho break of tho knoll west and south of tho Lacoy Honso tho first thiug In tho morning, and wo could havo mado ovory square foot of tho brush botweon that and tho Hagoraon and Chownlng clearings untenablo for evou a ground.squlrrol. I think tho lives and limbs of many poor Infantrymen might havo boon saved there had wo been properly put in at tho start.

(Continued on JJd page.) 'VfflBW CpFM'S PASS. The Start for tho Great Maryland Campaign. McOLELIiAN IN COMMAND. Slocum's Division Gallantly Ascends South Mountain. CHAKGING A STONE WAUL.

The Enemy Routed and Driven from -the Mountain. BY JOSEPH J. BARTLETT, MAJOR- VOLS. HE 0th of September, 1862, found the First Division of the Eighth Corp3in camp near Fairfax Seminary, nbout three miles from Alexandria, Va, It was well ty toward tho left of the Army of tho Po- tnmnn nffrr tha r- treat from tho disas- trous series of blun- -r. uera lermmniingwitn the battle of second Bull Run under Pope.

It had been there since the night of the 2d, resting, after tiresome marching and inglorious struggles with all sort3 of nemies, from a line of battle down to tho sneaking guerrilla. I commanded the Second Brigade of the division, having succeeded Gen. Sloeum at the battle of West Point, on the Peninsula. I was congratulating my Quartermaster upon his success in getting his last load of shoes for the barefooted men of the four regiments of my command, when through the clear air of the bright Septem ber day come from our right a steadily-increasing volume of sound, which swept down upon us as a great wave. My own troops took it up and sent it onward to the left with their strong voices, until it died in the far distance.

There cer tainly had been no victories won for which to cheer. There wn3 no voicing of this great shout, yot, when questioned, the soldiers said: "McCIellan is again in 'command." They did not know, for it was impossible for them to know, it as a fact Still, they persisted in that answer. I went immediately to corps headquarters, where many of tho General officers were paying their re-Bpects to our stanch and soldierly commander, Gen. Wm. B.

Franklin, and they knew nothing more about it than I did. I told them what the soldiers said, and a general discussion was lanched upon similar events occurring within the recollection of more than one old campaigner; but Gen. Franklin had received no order to that effect, or intimation that the army would move. It was more than an hour after this beforo ho received an order that Gen. George B.

McCIellan had been restored to the command of the Army of the Potomac and the defenses of Washington. This was accompanied with an order from Gen. McCIellan, Charge on the Stone Wall. assuming command, and for the Sixth Corps to movo at 3 o'clock, by tho Long Bridge, through Washington, on tho road to Tennallytown. Not all the Qunrtermasters of divisions aud brigades had been so fortunate as mine in getting the necessary ontfit for thoir suffering commands; but tho two orders wero received with enthusiastic cheors nlong tho wholo line, and tho camps were ALL BUSTLE AND CHEERFUL EXCITEMENT from that moment until the hoads of our columns drow out on the xoad toward Long Bridge Bands played, tho men stepped out with that veternu swine which is only acquired by troops after long and continuous campaigning, and tho Army of the Potomac scorned to bo itself again.

It was nearly 10 o'clock at night when we passed McClellau's house on It street, Washington, the wholo command singing, as those who had preceded us had done, "McOlellan la ourlender.ho Is gallant and stronp. For God and our country wo nru marching nlonir." The crowds upon tho streets cheered ns; ladies from windows and balconies waved handkerchiefs nnd flags. Even tho despairing patriot officials of Washington seemed hopeful and buoyant ouco more, as they saw tho old Army of the Potomac again starting to tho front under its real nml Invd nm mander, throwing itself between their threat ening auu enterprising enemy and tho spoils of oilice, to which they clung so fondly. Whilo we were passing through Georgetown I encountered Mnj. Nickolson, of tho Marine Corps, Avho had been second in command of the battalion of Marines brigaded with my regiment at tho battlo of first Bull Bun, on tho lookout for Gen.

Sloeum and me, to tako ns to his house, which was only a half block away from our route, to a suppor which his charming wifa had prepared for ourselves and staffs. We gladly accepted, and not only had a delicious entertainment in tho way of food and drink, but met many lady t.3r 4 mt 0mMmmm fedf liJl'i 5X-cj r.J3 rC iH friends to welcome ns and bid ns afterward Godspeed. Wo camped that night between Georgetown and Tennallytown. Resuming the march, in tho morning, wo soon began to find da-tached regiments and commands of all sorta generally resting beside the road, whoso appearance indicated that they word going forth for tho first timo to moot the enemy, and wero on the lookout for the corps, division or brigado to whleft thoy had been assigned. Tha Colonel of ono of these, A SPLENDID SEW YOKK P.E3TJIENT, the 121st, with full ranks, and earnest, intelligent young company officers, was looking fox Uon.

Slocnm, to whom ho finally reported, and. esked to bo assigned to my brigado. The poor Colonel (formerly and afterward a Hember of Congress) said ho was glad to got somewhere where ho and his regiment would be taken care of- They had jn3t arrived in Washington, and had been started immediately to the front without being told where tbey wero to go or to whom they should report. Tho Quartermaster, new to his duties, did not knowhowto provida jZ tfleir wants, and tbey wero in despair. They had now, however, reached their army homo; for from that day until the close of tha war they remained an honored part of thesama brigade.

Tho army made short daily marches, and waa kept well in hand. Its commander conld nofc, obtain that knowledge of the enemy's movements which would justify him in any risk of misinterpreting Gen. Lee's intentions, espeeir ally when both armies were near Washington. On the 13th, however, aa The Flag op "Loed Cobb's Legiox." order fell into the hands of Gen. ITcCIelkm issued by Lee, which folly disclosed hia plans in detail.

Gen. McCIellan then acted with great decision. The Eighth Corps was on the morning of the 1-Ith at tho foot of the Catoctin Mountain, near Jefferson, when Gen. Franklin received an order to cross the mountain and. Bccuro and hold the Pass over South Mountain near Burkittsville, about 10 miles distant Gen.

Smitn's Division headed the column across the Catoctin ranue. and ni fii jn i. opposite sido of the mountain we could occasionally get a view of the troops in front of us infantry, artillery and cavalry with thomorn-ing sun shining brightly upon their arms and accouterments, winding down and far out in tho beautiful valley toward the Blu Ridge. Such scenes, which look, tame upon canvas, ABE GL0EI0TJ3 TO THEYOXTG AJTD ENTHUSIASTIC SOLDTEB, who, feels a thrill of pride as he looks upon tho magnincent and real picture of war his comrades are presenting, aud recalls to his mind the many battles they havo already foughfi together, and is touched again with admiration and lovo for them as ho sees how willingly and eagerly they aro marching to hurl themselves against their old enemy in one morestrnggle for victory before that glorious sun shall fall below tho mountain ranges that surround them. After crossing into the beautiful valley below, a considerable hnlt was made, to allow Gen.

Couch's Division, which bad been ordered to join tho Sixth Corps, to come up. It was, however, so long in joining us, that Gen. Franklin decided to push on without It, in order to make his fight as early in the day as possible. Hero the First Divlsisn, Gen.SIocum commanding, was sent to the front to lead tho advance of the corps, and my brigade led the division. As tco ncxiroA villo I deployed the 90th Col.

Henry Cake commanding, aar skirmishers, and soon aftor they engaged the skirmishers of tha enemy, who retired slowly toward the town without making any serious resistance. My skirmish-line advanced steadily through tha town toward tho mountain Pass, which waa about a half mile beyond. Here the enemy was in position aud disclosed his batteries, far up on the crest, by opening up on the head of my column, which they now plainly saw filing into the fields from a littlo woed on our right of the road and town, and distant from it a half mile or more. Hore everything was halted, and while the men were taking their midday meal, tho General commanding camo up and established his headquarters in tha edgo of tho little wood, at a point from which ho could overlook the intervening valley, which stretched up to the base of the mountain, and had tho road leading to the Pa33 and tho Pass itself plainly In vision. After resting perhaps an hour in this position, the Adjutant-General of tho division.

Maj. H. C. Rodgers, came to me with a messago from Gen. Sloeum, saying ho would liko to see mo at Gen.

Franklin's headquarters, whero I immediately reported. HISTORICAL GEOUP OF OFFICERS. I found grouped there, resting upon the ground, in as comfortable positions as each one could assume, after lunch, smoking their cigars, Gon. Franklin, commanding tho corps; Gen. Sloeum and W.

F. Smith iBaldy), commanding respectively tho First aud Second Divisions; Gen. Hancock, commanding First Brigado, Smith's Division Gon. W. T.

H. Brooks, commanding Vermont Brigade, Smith's Division, and Gen. John Newton, commanding Third, Brigade, Slocum's Division. After a little preliminary conversation, not touching upon tho battlo beforo U3, Gen. Sloeum sudFenly asked mo on which side of the road leading through aud over tho Pass I would attack.

Without a moment's hesitation I replied, "On the 'Woll, goutlemen, that settles it," said Gen. Franklin. "Settles what. General," I exclaimed. "Tho point of attack." I was naturally muignanc mac snoum oo caiieu upon to giva oven an opinion upon such an important matter without previously heariug the views of such old aud experienced officers upon suoh an important question.

Gen. Sloeum then explained tho situatiou. In discussing tho question, it seems that they were equally divided in their opinions between tha right and left of tho road for tho main attack. Gen, Franklin then asked Gen. Slocnm who was going to lead tho attack.

Gen. Slocnm replied, Barfc-lett." Thou," said Gen. Franklin, "send for Bartlott and let him decide: ha has ram. I fully looked over tho ground from tha ngnt, and Ueu. Brooks has dona tha samo on the loft, and as Bartlett is to lead, tho assault, let him decide." This settled, the question as to whero tho principal attack was to bo made; and later, when we wero alone together, I asked Gen.

Sloeum what formation ho intonded to mako with the division. Ha said "As Gon. Franklin has allowed yon to decido tho point of attack, on the ground that you wero to lead it, it is no more than fair that I should leavo to you tho formntion." I suggested tho formation of the three brigades in column of regiments deployed, two Tegimonts front, at 10Q paces interval betweon lines (that would give us six lines); that the head of tha column should bo directed toward a point ha- i i i.