The Times from London, Greater London, England • Page 3

VTfiE flMES, MONDAY, UAY 9, 182 olutiosb akd jroncBs. riflN SUTTON'S Genuln. only rA Xstu. nRAXD and Co. 2L woois.

ESSENCE of tmWi rWwars eatantuasMOA Sols TTtTlOV. HKSRV LOVIBOXD and SOX, i. OoU MU1 UttfMiMMl Uroltk J' ia MnwimmrU KoU tSU ttnaaaa, 7 VIN0LIA SOAP It tit moat iait I VVL imMK "WUeAta asias Itlaixl cohxmt V. rJvSUj wwrmi r.w.ia.l. lad, itTiov xrxKrs refined rlack lf ad.

ilwt vmm OonTIi. Ask for Miryi hao tt. Ouaboav Tbor ara aowl TnJki w. U. tho larrsat Bitot "ff.5I.

rt.tU UMjnlMta, it.rTloN A I Lt water, ce nraA UMim mlM (him UrV Uses, HtthKlU LSukT i4 lit Wavers Uua a (wrluwiBC OwMl 7i TI0X Genuine CHLORODYXE. Each I iiU wi ressotjfor tamfhs. ssthnta, twois oa tao Unamwot mm to. bw of laveotor aL r. MUtM JfliSL fc 1 iMaJM vHiL ViITION A.

S. LLOYDS EUXESIS, for lim iktuj tail the buosaoi JVr7fJ wn ts roWAT. Iral. mart. iJ eooJwUl at Aso fobba oato 1 UUllxninul oaU iH stX a' iw aniuil uaulk iTlCE.

OlTFrrS to INDIA. China, and the X. ttst of ai iiit art tolas for ab lamnM oa arriK auao toTHKKMlKR ul xOTICi: UCHiNA. VALUED. CiU OreHtfvi'TV IWtwqiw I anion, w.

aOTICF lUVXl and Co. JiiiiKNCEot liKKK. fT oner. 1XR LTON A inferior imiti. VxmeE ELECTIUC LIGHT FITTINGS, Lul KtmIoU.

UrproJvHioa, of th Am 'JJ? 12iis XIV, XV ..4 XVI. PQU. JTC ItlJ. W. NOTICE.

curt. MCI CM 1L M. Mukr nnUMlrr K3 UM Mkuo, svod of wry rrrt BerTtea ta 0TICF. LIVERIES, flirt Saioa. XJRED WEBB MILES and COMFAXY, "i fraSJES a srtClALrrV, A repntation of I ihxm 2t optjlory.

Ittoa aadcnU lor cMk. bat WiriorfM.lu IUIMOVtl tram U. rixadSr (coraar SPECIAL NOTI CE. AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL tad IXyUlKV AGKSCY. Mr.

W. MA UK A. who kfihnrt all Lot OiLiawa, oill gil ttitiot to Odonlal IsTcat arn land aad auasnc tvormifa rranuwd. Oindnuta aoaoUrCMM. Mncumk of oUaodd.

Lobr tBioma aao at trt.te. iililttrv ttywt. Ixmd on. C. JLAF REPORT, May 7.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE. COURT OF APPEAL. (Btffi Lou Btm. Low Jcitici Fit, Loed Jcstics Lore.) it aofiA t. ocTn aniCA coxrAxr covrAxm si xocimbiqcx t.

txitun ioctb AFKICA COMfAXT. Jod(inDl waa girtn to thcae aciioet oo appeal from a fodrmBt of Mr. Joatite Wrifht and Mr. Joatica Lawranct, jirrn cn the SOtb of February I ait, and reported in 8 Tit Uer orU, SCO. raliinr the qnettioa whether each eetien eoald hroocht in the llirb Coart of Jaitfce.

The action were (at the Jadf in the Court hclow ttated) for the purpoao of trying the right of the Britiah Sonth Africa Company to certain territories in South Africa which they hare occupied, but which were alleced Ly the pUintiffa to be nnder Ua aoTereicnty of Fortoral and to belong to the plaintiff at Fortaguete ubjecti, hy Tirtue ot con ceaatoa from the State of Portojal and from natire chief. But thouch the plaintiff claimed a declara tion of their title to the land, the action wa not for reeorrry of the land, but for damage for treipas on the land and boilding of the plaintiff and their exclusion therefrom, and taking away of their stock kc. The British company in lubitance pleaded that the act complained of were done in assertion of their title to the land under grant from a natire aorereign chief. The Court below had held that the High Court had not jurisdiction to euteitain such an action ercept as to personal property. ana me piainuiu oaa appraiea, (n the araument ol the aroeal the claim for a declaration of the plaintiff' title to.

the land and for an injunction to protrct their title to it wa abandoned, and the appeal wa argued aa to the claim for damage for the trespaasc to the plaintiff' land and their exclusion therefrom. In the result it will he ern their Lordship were divided iniopinion. Lord Ester being ot opinion tbat toe Divisional ourt were right, but the Lords Justice being of, a contrary opinion, and so for the present the plaintiffs 'prevail, and the iudement of the Divisional Court is reversed. Lok Esunn delivered LisjudiueDt, which wa in writing, in these term This eae wa heard and determined in Divisional Court under and by virtue of an order, dated the 17th ot November. 1891.

made by Mr. Justice Henn Collin, in Chamber, by which it wa ordered that the question of law raised by paragraph 1 and 2 of the defence, and paragraph 2 (a amended) of the reply.should be forthwith disposed of. The statement of claim assert that the plaintiff axe a l'ortuiruese company that the company was in possesion and occupation, of certain large tract of land and territories anil goia ana otner mine, aituate in itanira and elsewhere in Sooth Africa. The statement then aver the ownership and suzerainty of the rortnguese elate, and a concession by tnal state of the mines, ic, tj the plaintiff. By paragraph 7 the nlaintiff romDanv.

in support of the claims hereinafter set forth, will rely on their being in possession and occupation a aforesaid. Further, or in the alter native, it will relv on the title acquired aa stated. The statement of claim then aver that the defendant company by it servant and agent wronglnlly broke and entered the nlaintiff company' said land and territories, mines, mineral, and mining right, and forcibly seised ani took possession of the said land and territories, ouiiaing ana erections, mines, iriIAt VOTICE lUTAVD and Co. Purwrors ana territories, Duuaings uu crrcuouf, m.u, caal auu 'oMRn Cwm ol lied uraen Ubol) aaJ otter of agents, arc. vj rvajou oi me mourn amaioalitia.ha NOTHXMVa ttuaa ttMaraola aOlroa.

Hi plained of the plaintiff company ha been deprived of Lanaavwrt, Maiatf. w. aoj joit jaad and territorie. mine, ic. REMOVED from 23, Old Ikmd etrcct 1XALDANE, The statement then feU forth that the plaintiff com rrtiH.

and Ov. atetarr TaJorm, BjcljWn Janliiocu Mains mg. claim (1) a declaration that it wa lawfult ti La, Utmmtnma 1 irj lunula jaaacra, aiBBuns: ana oa a.aioi ilioaura a i. Oarkatrt. IkmA atwt I nwlrn.

W. 1700D and COOKERY EXHIBITION, Portmaa Kooma. Mar. 1S3S. IV DEOOBATED DLaoaUtr TA KLU for hich F.

as4 a Oaler ku Maanb4asv4doUl. w3X ba OS ViaVW at Uxar Sbov ai, xx xfsr)Rt. darUx present wed. laKtin to IbtAoJ. VEGRETTI and ZAMBRA'S OPERA.

Race, and Xi FlaU nanralWd oe pawrr and dcfiuUoa. In alloc aHS coeplrta. lo aod throt sriaoaa and "oiwrafda. WEDDING and BIRTHDAY PRESENTS. IT tliELTTI rAVBR V1OriJtA le ojefal orBaati.ajpwoltfaahwmoXooatoMfmneaa.

METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS. Baro BWfa Thf taaoiogteea. Aoemoasetvrs. Rain Aosrdns. aaaimiUiol to Uoral Otsmuaj, tbo alotcoralo avai Ltftca.

Ar. Liluirald liau tro by port. "VEGRETTI anl Qaeert, A BrliaS aod ortnra OoraraasaiiU, Ati. Tba accuracy ol all lo tiinL loeulaaodabippanaupplMil. Uotbom Ltraaaa 4i OorahiU: U2.

fiwtot smjot. loaao. fTaau ci3. Crfi tlaoa. Weohoae N'o.

6.581. II. STEWARD'S SYSTEM each ejr WioVf proyrtf ujteX Erron of rrtravctioa. C1GUT TESTING. a oaiaf coca era Miax aA aa aaurataEMav caa Octretoi.

and ULJaSdES to comet aama anid. Aa ial optoraewr aol aiwaaal tett lM oaad. AdV vwtrea, or pampalrt Hw aasat tba ai(lu, 6th eoitioo. aent bf fi alA. i 4iS, Strand lAadoo.

Upciciaa to tba v2aBue noapttai aoq iu a. uowwwm. ItOWNISG PERFECT MICROSCOPE. rrice C3 I5. Catakcn of Mieroaeope post tree.

JliU.V C3. 8lraod, Lnndoo, W.C XLLIAKD elegant oak. nlnut. IX iakrn. xxuv roil ttzrd crud ExUUtioa 11LL1ARDS Superior fall size, thick slat bed.

XJ 2 mhaiij, law iVt cushion Ut, ditto, for us oa UMe, lvd Mpehor lt be4 ttaitcUr CI complvU jr 4 ird orir n4 GEO. WKIGUTand Billiard Ts it fby tnwciU appointment to ILILEL the Prise for xAL. a vprcai tiavtra ruiiixtM mavsoooy 1 J. nlf tocro nw4 a lev tixs. fittod wiLta Uuir poXPtit low fcx jo, ihcaUaiu tlUocs for rool, and rrruudi i sv uv orwiBcr 101, ruiorw.

Loutooi iMgx. Lortalw fiiitrto (nis Bffdilh Zjj tab to uct to oeloct from. SKXAMEL PAINT, in any colour XJ ti for lndt.or oauile, oa wood, iron, hosrpitals. O4ork'as PrcacrraUvo tSolatiOQ preraoU damp, rttr swue fgrm, ocmeoi. wax.Dfrproo.

pLEaATlaA NEEDLE has been uccessfully a ir ao ua Caixuauc ceccw ox um juoooos acuospocTO Of nem. Ax to the TSX HSTlItrCTIE LE PAIKT C05C lfiem, kc to the IMJESl rx CttcMtivaK, London, KX TK LITERAUV 3LACUINE (used by IVince A wai. aox wtom lnpcrorl for boUinf a book. j. tfggt.

PoctlaaJ plaoo. tonduo. W. BREAKFAST in BED. JOHN CARTER'S UfcVuLVisi; EED TABLK.

adjutable to anr bniihl or in. a'iiHf aa4 vnunf. lcs from 12 5a. Lrrawmzs treo. an.Cfca.

j.e tAtaojiaiotreet. roruand plaea. w. INVALID COMFORTS. JOHN CARTER'S A MIJi tJUUClfES aol CIIAIK bipdisraa Ad bed boLba, 1 1a; porta bio w.c'a, ija.

twuble Taruaa batb. 2 oomaodes, boi nau. a td. lex rv 13L bod taUss, U. M.

bed LIU 3 13a. at ai. nto.uo irrbod for loralidA Drawiors Duatxrea. AUTtfe ya. Xr OaoJlab trol.

rUaod olace. W. CELF PROPELLING EASY CHAIRS, from 2 vaUiBZ fiaariiiB. 1 1 JL eterdsiaf chairs for IndlvatiOB 'Xfioa. ijl ad.

carrruij ehaira. AX AT1I CHAIRS. 1 elezaat appearance: "fl.VAL CAKIUAUF. 2 tOa. boapttal and noliot ambo aod ViUaca Can.

Drawings freo. olrsyt. I'artJaod placa. Loo don. lawfully in noaaeaxion of and entitled to.

and was and i the owner ol ana entmea to tn possession ana occupa f2) an iniunetion restraining the defendant company, its servant, or agent from continuing or repeating the wroiirfnl acta and matters aloreiaia ana irom continu ing to occupy or from aucrticg any title to the said laads. ic, and from preventing the plaintiff company. 4c, from taking poeion thereof and occupying and exercising ani enjoying the tame, ic. (3) damages. The statement of defence in paragraph 1 is teat, as to so mncn oi uc navemen 01 ciaim on allerrs title in the plaintiff company to the said land, ic, and alleges that the defendants, by their servants and agents, wrongfully broke and entered the same, and claim a declaration and an injunction, the defendant, whilst denying the alleged title and the altered WTocxtol act, say test tse taia isna ana territories, and mines, ic, are situate abroad to wit.

in Sooth Africa, and out of the jurisdiction of this honourable Court, and the defendants submit tnat tuts Honour Die vourc nas no jurisdiction ra sojuuiuic and will decline to adjudicate upon so much of the plaintius' claim a aioresaia. ice amenaeu repiv, ai to in is naxairraDn tai ox uie aciencr. is un uiaio tiffs. in addition to ioininc isiue thereon, will obiect inai paragrapu a is oau in law, man uac saj it does not disclose any valid ground of defence (2) that the Court ha and will exercise jurisdiction to adiudicate on ue said claims (o) toat ua saia paragraph does not show that there is any Court other loan uiat in which ion uon urvugu. uo.ui iwii dietion to adiudicate on the said claim: 1 4) in dependently of and in addition to the allegations in the above paragraph the plaintiffs say that there is no competent tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate on the said claims in the country where the act complained of were committed.

The statement of claim in paragraphs 1G and 17 avers that the acts complained of were done maliciously and with intent, ic. The statement of defence in paragraph 2 submits tbat, aa matter of law, the said paragraphs do not, nor does either of them, disclose any valid cause of action. In paragraph 9 of the defence the defendants allege, a concession to them of the lands and mines in question br a native chief named Cmtasa, ie. In paragraph of the amended reply the plaintiffs obiect that the defence, even neb. a qnctllotu Ha said that tha nqslrtmtnt of a local venae was a fetter on tha jurisdiction, and that now by tha Judicature Act th fetter was taken off.

and theme) tha on (diction wa tree. In support of this proposition he maintained that the Court of Chancery, being not hound by tha fetter of venae, had aiwsys entertained ana cserciseu iuu jutibuicwuu. BtrC. Russell in a condensed but powerful answer athared op tha propooitions enunciated by Hit II. imi ami eanbAbad each of them.

Hit argument wa tharefora almost if not entirely, an argument of negation. The main point in tha case seems to me to be whether the English Court have ever, for the purpose of granting any relief whatever, entertained any action loonaea airecuy on aa injury plaintiff in respect of hi right to land or other immovaoie property aituaiea aoroau, aw, nut, wa baa been the real ground of their refusal to do so. Has the refusal been rested on the norelr municipal dimeultv with regard to tha venno of the place where uie mcaioa IB hj oo uimt or upva riw un dimeulty that the law of England ha declined from toe Dexiuniug to aaauxae junsuicuou I iu cvuuuc. ing thi matter we shall Lava to deal with and to rive their true meaning to various expression ued by awyers namely, aa to property being movable or immovable, aa to action pertonam or ta rest, a to action being transitory or local, a to vesne Keinr transitorv or loeal. a to Ux tori.

ItX domicilii. lex ret ifz. The question whether the Courts of a naiion will or win nut ruirnnu junnicuvu mij dispute Is to be determined exclusively by the nation itscii s.c, oy i La zuuoicipai law. at uj tA legislation the Court are directed to exercise juris diction the Court must obey. If there i a proper inference to ue same ellect tne result is ue same.

But there are certain rule which have by universal canarnt inJipated the eirrnmstaneea from which the inference may properly be drawn. We have to consider wnatisvneiniercnceinrespcctoi nainuuuig awvw. Tha fir, I rraat cardinal rule, aereedl upon br all jurist, i one arising necessarily Irom the division oz mankind into nations. is piain tsat ue a of on country can have no intrinsic force, propria rigor except within the territorial limit and jurisdiction or that counter. Whatever extra territorial force they nave i the result.not of any original power to extend them abroad, but of that respect wiucn irom motives of public noliev other nations are disposed to yield to them, ie." Story on The Conflict of Adtwa" ifili uo natural principle flowing from the equality and independence of nation" (teetion 8).

The direct consequence is that the laws of every 8tate affect and bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its territory and all persons who are resident within it. whether natural born (ubiecu or alien ana also aii rnntraeta mada and act dona within it. A State mar therefore regulate the validity of acts done within it, tha resulting richt and dutie cTOwinf out of these act, and the remedie and mode of administering justice in all cases within its own dominions (section IS). Another consequence is that no State or nation can by Its laws directly attect or bind property out of it own territory, or bind persons not resident Ihmii 'section 20). With rerard.

then, to acts done within the territory of a nation all are agreed tbat such nation ha without more jurisdiction to determine the resulting rights growing out of those acta': but with recard to acts done outside it terri tory it has no jurisdiction; to determine resulting rtgnis growing out 01 looso acts, unless sucu jurisuic tlon ha been allowed to it br the comity of nation This redueea tha Question under discussion to be whether, in regard to an act of trespas done to land situated outside it territory, there is evidence to instifv the inference that bv the comity of nations the jurisdiction to determine the right resulting from sucn an act oa oeen auowea uj ouier nations iu country and has been accepted br this country. And the form of the inquiry shows that the solution of that question does not aepena upon ue laws ot proceaure in litigation adopted by this country, but upon tha comity ol nations a between this country ana otner countries. In a long examination of cases, in which by a tacit universal consent of all civilised nations, it i to bo inferred that each of them ha recognized the jurisdiction of other nations in soma matters extra territorial. Story ha shown that all nations have recognized a distinction between what the civil lawyers or writers have called personal and real laws and between movable ana immovable property, ai iu the former, is to be noticed that they use the word statute as meaning "law." "The civilians have variously defined the different classes of statutes or laws. Personal statutes are held bv them to be 01 general obligation and force everywhere but real statutes are held to have no extra territorial force or obligation.

Personal statutes are those which have nrincinallv for their obiect the person and treat only ol property inciaemaiiy. neai statutes are woso which nave principally for their object property, and WU1CU OO HUfc FJ1CB Ul pciauua OACCpb IU ICiiHVU IV property (section ioj. neat are called personal laws," then.are of general force and obligation every where what are called real laws have no extra territorial force or obligation whatever. This distinction is by traiversal consent. The next recognised distinction is between; different kind of property.

xTopeny I personal, real, or mueu, orii ia no, auto nd immovable. It may. for tha purpose of inter national jurisdiction, be divided into personal or movable property and real or immovable property "at (section 374). "Movables' follow the person." The probability is tbat the doctrine has not its oricin in anv distinction between real laws or personal laws, or in any fictitious annexation of them to the person of the owner, or their incapacity to have a fixed situs but in an enlarge! policy growing out ot ueir tranaitory nature am uie general convenience of nations. II the law ret site: were generally to pre' vail in regard to movables it would bo utterly impos sible for the owner, in many cases, to know in what manner to dispose of them during his life or to distribute them only from the uncertainty of their situation in the transit to and from different places, but from the impracticability of knowing with minute accuracy the law of transfer inter vitot, or of testamentary disposition and successions in the different countries in which uey might happen to DC.

Any change of place at a future time might defeat the best considered will and any sale or donation might be rendered inoperative from the ignorance of hrftfjoaa nlaa can have anr applieatfon. It would absurd to snppoM that the authority to make oridartj for the linproTemetrt of procedure isvolved atrtoorfty to usurp a new jurisdiction titter ia respect of persons or of Lord Kestbury in tha same ea. distinctly state that it it generally agreed by European nation that all questions relating to tha ovacfriP 0( Und mxui decided by tha Us loci rtt do not say that the title to the ownership of land must be so decided, but that all questioos relatlng to such ownership mutt be so decided. Tha rid wd answered ia mi hi v. oi iuo ctate iriais.

The order of the Rouse of Lord wa that it be to all the Judges to consider of Ekinner's petition, and to report to tha House whether the petitioner was relievahle upon the matters therein wou.ivuou law or equity, and. if so, la what matters alleced in paragraph 9 of the del if true, which is denied, do not constitute any valid the parties of the law of the actual sifut at the time ground of defence. The first matter to be determined of their acts. A sense of general utility therefore is what is the question of law, or what are the que must have first suggested the doctrine, and as soon a tions of law, which are raised by the pleadings, and it wa promulgated, it could not fail to recommend which, under and by virtue of the order of the 17th of 1 itself to all nation by it simplicity, it convenience, November, are to be disposed of forthwith. The 1 and its enlarged policy (section 379).

But be things done by the defendants, which are com the origin of the doctrine what it may, it has so plained of by the plaintiffs, are that the defendants, 1 general a (auction among all civilized nation that it by their servant, broke and entered the land may now be treated as a part of the gentium. and territories and mines of the plaintiffs and Lord Loughborough has stated it with great clearness, forcibly reized and took possession of the same and It is a clear proposition, he ssys, not only of the ejected the plaintiff company and its servants, ic. law of England, but of every country in the world and that the defendant did these acts maliciously where law ha the semblance of science, that per and with intent. The plaintiffs assert that these acts sonal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, were wrongful as against them because they, the not that personal property has no visible locality, but plaintiffs, were owners of the lands, territories, that it is subject to that law which governs the person mines, ic, or because they were in possession and of the owner.

It follows the law of the person" occupation of them. The plaintiffs, in respect of (section 380). These are the reasons for the general these rights of theirs of ownership, or possession, so I consent as to personal property that it follows the infringed aa alleged, claim a declaration that they person, and it is the general consent which gives the IAj 1) EUAM IJL" LATORS. in new art colours. BAS illTTt.

1 Ijajmlquili or. on fcHtr bicycle wheela. tadia Vj inmu hood iu rart 1 Ia Drawing post free J'' U.rMtfa. wtWiliab rT. PorUaod plaon.

W. hiFrttUS anlfB'ONSTYIire and Riirglar PtooI M.r:u!atturtra and Ixaters la Socabd taod Safes also lf 1 tr Mtrtjua 'lUMrfhA irchaf your Safca. rwjmir jvar Kaft. a nwn; your hafes. liuba, taisast Lfcaien ia the world.

ri'l'''' lear. a birrm. CanMm mt. E.C. PERFECTION in DRIVING DELTS.

DlCK'S A ArtJfT Bl.LT IrantaA ulu. pnetta, aod baUta) a raaiara aaVoa aacaaoot and oeonoutf. ictal I turn. vo iiaiiM lot wctoraAmpsitaa. Satuba for ererr dasalpUaa of nu dViriaf auntUi ttrelduaz or tvrj bait suaraatoed lMU.nurb fronatb patantMS and aoU I.

aol a. Ul 'UCMJ "PATE.NT CN I'IClCVljLli LOCKS 3," b. acunly wainrt banian. Talent Detoctor for all an' Larta fna Chubb'a. 12S.

I FMPIlltKVhr" IRON ISL'iLDINGS. jwrtablT, pswu boildum to rrfrr to.50 In nock. 'ai: noma Koautoa Exlutauuna. alao ILdilArjt andKaTal i 11 ainbKTs Oiboaaoa Wprsa, llrdg TAra, W. ASHING.

Notice uTileads of Families. The t' VAf, AXUSWOIiTU LAUSUKV. Wandsworth w.l.U Civn bcrnx btonal. Las bora totablubrd for liia. tatt a ear Ia Tin; liisnor or Lonion on lircucAL Re The Bishop of London presided on Friday ileriioon in Sion (Allege at the annual meeting of Loudon Diocesan Church Keadiug Union.

The Fort, Jjreeiitcd by the Iiev. Blocnfield Jacksou. Jttciral honorary secretary, showed that although aiuoa v0 Jemn mfo hd now UaKhrs. Yotea of thanks having been passed, tha jAVop UstribuUJ the certificate won by examination Ujc rr.r ..,1 .,11.... ho acer tad the least fear of danger to the Christian v'Tkhi from the progress of study, even when carried bvtoen 1 v.

tv. tinve, many individuals were in' danger owing to Mahy investigator were in the habit "nuuag their own gueaBes with the facts, and Jfring rr ineoovrtdent gap to make their em conplcU. A very large part of that liena rf aerirture and faith would speedily disappear "aid i wrr rnoeh more general and writer knew too much to swallow everything. At the 7." another SO years he Ulieved a rrrat deal of eorrfidetitly asserted would be absolutely 7j.w Yet they mast not be too hard cm these Wigators, tor even great light of science could Ml found eeymg they were certain of one thing in 1880 leeling certain ot quit tha other thing la 1890. were lawfully in possession, and that they were the owners, and an injunction against the defendants from continuing or repeating the wrongful acts, or from asserting any title to the said lands, ic.

and they claim damages for the. injury caused to them by the wrongful acts i.e., bjr the breaking and entering and ejecting. The defendant by way of answer say in paragraph 11 of the defence that said lands and territories and mines are situate abroad to wit, in South Africa, and out of the jurisdiction of the English Court. The plaintiffs reply that paragraph 11 of the defence discloses no valid ground of defence, and assert that the Court Las and will exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate on the said claims. The repli cation Ucs seta lortn two reasons wny ue uourt win exercise jurisdiction in this case, although in other cases ox similar claims wiui rcgaru to xauua auroau ib would not.

The questions of law so far raised by the Eleadings are, lias the English Court jurisdiction to car and determine, as against a British subject resident in England, a complaint that he broke and entered and dispossessed the plaintiff of lands and mines, possessed and occupied by or owned by the plaintiff, such lands and mines being situated abroad Can the English Court make a declaration as to the lawfulness of the plaintiff's possession or ownership Can the English Court issue an injunction against the defendants Can the English Court award damages in respect of the breaking and entering 7 Ihese questions are independent ot the form of pleading i.e.. are td be considered upon the assumption that they rn an nleaded as to be broucht before the Court. There it another question of law raised by paragrsph 3 of the amended reply namely, wncucr tne question of the jurisdiction of the Court is properly raised by the defendants' mode of pleading. The questions of law raised by the paragraphs iu anu it oi ue ciaim acd by paragraph 9 of the defence depend to a certain extent upon the decision of tho former questions. The Divisional Court.in a most "careful judgment delivered by Mr.

Justice Wright, has dismissed the action so far as it claims a declaration of title to land, and also so far as it claims an injunction in relation to trespass to land, and also so far as it claim damages ia respect or trespass to lana, ana aiso, as to paiagraiu 16, so far as it claims relief in respect of a malicious trespass to land. The judgment maintain the validity in narawranh I of the defence, and so much of the defence ia paragraph 2 of the defence a relates to the malicious trespass to land, but overrules the defendant' objection to so muen oi paragrapnio as refer to matter other uan trespass tana. iuc nvomlea the whole of narairrach 2 of the reply." Against this judgment the plaintiffs have i With roennl to the claim of the plaintiffs not overruled, the defendants have not appealed. It seems abundantly clear that by ue pieaaing ue mam substantial question In dispute and intended to be mA .1 dtrmind br the Court wa the k. i.l.

and that th. plaintiffs claimed a binding declaration by the Court that their title to the land and mines wa a good legal title. That claim was urged throughout ia the Divisional Court. It is Insisted on In th. notice of PPL It was argued before us and persisted In to the fullest derroo bv Mr.

Ramnoa. But Sir H. JtDA in moat able Argument relied more particularly on tha proposition that tha action could be supported on aa alterna tiva view namely, aa oa a claim for damage only in reanoet of an intmaian on the plaintiffs' possessory title, in which view he urged that the action was only ursoaaat and a transitory action, because it did not a that view raise any question of title to land. He argued with great earnestnes that tha only reason why the Court had declined to adjudicate on tha title to foreira land wa that tha trial of such anoatinw. lrv Vnl i.h law af nraeedure recmired local venue and aa no local venue in England could b.

given, tho Court could not axarcia. jurisdiction to try general jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is prior to any rule of ttnue made with regard to the method of exercising the jurisdiction. We then have to consider the question of whether by general consent, the only valid ground on which it can rest, a similar jurisdiction has been given in respect of real or immovable property. The general principle of the common law is that the laws of the place where such property is situate exclusively govern in respect to too right ox ue parties ue moaes oi transfer ana the solemnities which should accompany them." (section 421).

In the main proposition they i.e., all jurists generally concur that tne law of the rituj exclusively governs as to immovable property (section 47). The common law has avoided all difficulties by'a simple and uniform It declares that the law of the riu shall exclusively govern in regard to all rights, interest, and tiles, in and to immovable property (section 4boJ. Jbe law of the situs governs all rights in and to land. One right to land is the right that a stranger shall not enter upon it against the consent of the owner. In sections 551 and 552, Story further states the opinions of the foreign jurists and, finally, in section 554, he states what, in his opinion, is the law of Eng land the common law oi England.

it win do perceived that in many respects the doctrine laid down coincides with that of the common law. It has been already stated that by the common law personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in any place where ue party deienaant can be louna that real actions must be brought in the forum ret fitar, and that mixed action are Properly referable to the same jurisdiction. Among the latter are actions for tres passes ana injuries to real property, wmcn are deemed local, so that they will not lie elsewhere than in the place ret nice." (section 554) This is a direct statement ot the law upon the very question before us. Cpon this long review of a most able treatise I come to the clear conclusion that an action quart clautum regit cannot be entertained by an English Court in respect of an alleged wrongful entry on land situated abroad and that the ground of the inability is not that by the procedure regulating English litigation there can be no local venue given for the purpose of trial, but on the ground that no consent ol 'other nations py way of comity to Ue exercise of such jurisdiction can be inferred, and on the ground that all countries, including England, have consented or agreeu urn sucn an action is a real or mixed action as distinguished from a personal action, that it is an action which regards the right resulting irom ue ownership, py possession or ouerwise, oi ue Immovable property, land, and mere I ore, uat any claim in respect of any alleged injury of any kind to those rights to land cannot be tried in any nation but that in which is the titut of the land i.e., in which the land is situated. The question is not a question of municipal venue, but of national stfus.

And this being so, the whole ingenious argument of Sir II. James fall to the pound if thi it an action in respect of an alleged wrongful entry on land. That the municipal ruia oi procedure are not to be considered until tha question of jurisdiction it determined is pointed out by Lord Westbory in Cookney v. Anderson (1 De Gex. Jones, and Smith) Anv rules which a Court of justice may make touching its procedure must, of course, be taken a intended to apply only to sucu junsuictiuu anu auuiomy aa it uaa toe rirht to exercise." That the English rule of venno ar.

rule made for the purpose of determining in what part of England certain causes ah All be tried by the Enslish Common Law Court or Court cannot be denied. Tber are. therefore, rule for regulating the procedure of the English Court or Courts. Tber can be applied only to the trial of causes which tha English Court have jurisdiction to try. The question of iurisdictioa cannot bo nude to depend oa those rule.

It must be determined by other consideration manner, upon the several part of the complaint of th" petition." Tho Judge anwered that the inoitwr. toucmng talcing away of the petitioner's hip and goods, and assaulting of hi person, notwith fUj nme were done heyond the eas, might be determined upon by his Majesty's ordinary Courts at Westminster and aa to the dispossesaieg him of his bouse and island, that be was not relierable in any ordinary Court of law." It must be observed that the question distinctly referred to the Court of equity M.T. 1 'w anwer, therefore, is that the petitioner was not reliavabla in anv Conrt. either of aw or equity. The answer ranld n'nt ho wivon in reliance on there beinv no laeal nniu in tho ano af there being no place of trial, because that dimeulty bad no application to the Court of equity it mut i ur? conclusion uat lor other reason neither Court had jurisdiction.

That opinion of tha Judge ha never born nnoatinnad. It haa atarawa km followed. It agree with the distinction I have shown to nave been taken by all the foreign jurists. It is aa agreement bv tha Kntrli.h Jnda with that di.tin. tion, a distinction as to jurisdiction and not as to procedure.

The case of Doulaon v. Mathews id T.B., p. 503) teams to raise exactly the point taken before us namely, tbat where th action ask for dam Ages only it can be maintained. It was as action ol trespass tor entering the plaintiff's house in Canada and expelling him. Lord Kenyan, at the trial, wa dearly of opinion that the onestion wa whether an action of trespas could be brought in thi country for ton injury statea ue count, and held Uat It could not, because the cause of action stated in that count was local.

Erskine moved to set aside the nonsuit on tba ground that this wa not an action to recover the land, but merely a personal action to recover damage, which wa transitory, and might ba tried here. Buller, (J.I. It is now too lata for us to inquire whether It wa wise or politic to make a distinction between transitory and local actions it it sufficient for the Court that tha law hat settled th distinction, and that an action auart ebiutun frtyil is local. Wo may try actions here which are in ueir nature transitory, though ariaing out of a transaction abroad, but not such a ara in their nature local." The phraseology is important. It i not tuch as have a local venue it is such as are in their nature local.

It refers, not to the venue which fixes in England the place of trial in all cases which are to be tried in England, but to the distinction recomized in all countries between transitory and local actions a distinction taken in order to determine whether the Court of particular countries can or cannot entertain the action at all. The decision is founded, la respect of authority, on Skinner's case," and declines to louow tne oecisions to ue contrary of liora JUansneld, statea ny mm in ilostjn r. falngas." Tha decision in uouiion v. Mathews" has always been fol lowed, and it has been always treated a overruling the case mentioned by Lord Mansfield In Uortyn v. Fabrigas.

It has been al ways so treated both ia England and America. The case of "Pike v. Eden's Bep.) i to the Ame effect, though not so pointed. But is ia iwiMjriau, ueciuH it ia a ucciaioa on uiii ecruitr. The hill asked for an order directing an iuoa to try the validity of a will a to real estate in Pennsylvania.

Lord Northington refused. I build my opinion," ha says, materially on the fact of the lanas lying in rennsyivsnia, lor a will ot lands lying in any of the coloniet it not triable in Westminster nll." In Wey v. Yally (6 283 Holt (C. upon a ease of Parker v. Darner being cited, in which the Court had declined to enter tain an action ot debt for rent of land in Ireland arainit the aasicnee of a term, said i Your ease of Parker v.

Darner is good law. for, being brought against the assignee, it is grounded upon the privity of estate, which it local, and therefore to be brought where the land lies." In Mayor of London v. Cox (2Engliah and Irish Appeals) we have the great authority of Mr. Justice AVilles on two points which have been raised in the present case. A dilatory plea to the jurisdiction is a plea admitting the general jurisdiction of the Court, but exempting tha defendant'! case from tha jurisdiction on special grounds (pp.

259 2C0). But there is a larger objection to jurisdiction, whiebfneed not be pleaded, but which, if pleaded, is a plea in bar. Even in superior Court themselves, where the subject matter is such as to imply a local limit of jurisdiction; the exception i peremptory there I no necessity for a dilatory plea, anr ia tha obieetlon waived br pleadinc in chief. Thus if an act ion of trespas to land situate abroad was brought in the Queen' Bench the defendant need not plead a dilatory plea showing what Court has jurisdiction, but if the foreign locality appear upon the count ha may demur, ani if it does not appear he may plead in chief or bar a denial of the trespass, and at the trial the plaintiff would be nonsuited or lose tne veruict and whether unon demurrer or plea the ordinary iude ment would be given for the defendant Doulson r. Mathews 1 He sneaks, not of a local venue.

but of a local limit of jurisdiction. In WhiUker v. Forbes (10 L.R., 583), the action wa in debt for arrears of a rent charge upon land in Australia In mv iodrment in that case I said. Where there ia no contract or covenant, but the debt only arise by reason of privity or estate, that it to say, when tba liability depends on the defendants being in possession of the estate charged and not on privity of contract, then the venue is local, and the action must be brought in the locality wnere ue iana is situatca. Hera tha action does not arise out of privity of con tract, but is founded on a breach of duty to pay a certain sum arising out of privity of estate.

Therefore if the estate had been in England, the venue must have been laid: in the county where ue estate was. Here the was an English will, and we must take it that it does in England create a rent charge in respect of property In Australia but tne venna bei'mr local, and the land being in Australia, no action will lie ia England for the plaintiff cannot bring an action in England that can only be in.ti I think. Instead of venue. I should have said action." me phrases wouia have' then been then the action is local and the action being local." The judgment of Mr. Justice Lindler is more accurate.

He says, such an action of debt as which arises not from privity of contract but from privity oi estate oniy, is a action. If this be so, it seems to iouow mcviiaoiy on the authority of Doulson r. Mathews that the action is not maintainable." The truth it that there winda nf venna the one venue for deter mining jurisdiction, tho other venue for determining place of trial. The one is international, ue ouer municipal. The ease was affirmed in tho court ot Appeal (1 C.P.D.,p.

51). For the reasons given in the previous part of this judgment, I cannot adopt the suggestion of Lord Cairns, with regard to which he mill! ton rovldnjo Tt waa naU. omVlAtw. but it it without neognitioa or authority. losd Jciticx Fxr then delivered a written judgment to tha contrary effect in favour of tha plaintiffs, and it will be seen that in this Lord Justice Lope ccaeurred.

Th plaintiff, he taid, alleged themidres to be in terested in lands ta Africa of two kinds tha ona land aituat. within territorina acemirod br Porfaual and granted by that State to them, tha other by grant from native chief; they rly on title a regards both these kind of. land, and they alio rely on their possession they allege act of trespass on the. iana eomnutrca by toe defendant, and uar further al leged that there il no eomnatent triumal ha vuur inria diction to adjudicate on their claim in th. country wner.

ue acta complained of were committea. Th. relief which th. plaintiff hare sought so far aa it relate in any way to the land may be said to be, (1), el aueLT IIUS UU U2JUSCUOU SO give effect to it (3), damage for trespas to th. anu uu an injunction to prevent Turtner tret naaa.

Tha mint imnnrt.nt h.i. i try aa action for tresnas to land tuch aa the nrrsent. wa whether the Court could entertain jurisdiction to a1 wer onlT prevented from so doing owing to th. make a declaration a to the title to foreign land this, however, has been abandoned on the and are not therefor concerned with it our concern now is with tha question. Can this Court entertain jurisdiction in an action brought against a person resident in England for damage for trespass to land situate out of England in a place where there i no Court of competent jurisdiction If the question be considered historically and with reference to the Court before the 18th entnrw tho anawar a.n.t in mw tha came of action arose abroad, outside the boundarV of negative.

So long as all actions were loeal. it it i "7 county, the Court here could not entertain it. obvious that no action, whether it related merely to because no local venna could be aaalgned to It. With matter personal or to immovable property, in which option uicu wig ia the cause of action arose out of this country, could where, this was found inconvenient, and th. Courts, possibly be tried in any Court in England.

When th. order to relieve thejnaelve, mad. a distinction distinction arose between local and transitory action. between transitory matters, which might happen any and ue transitory actions only, where ue cause oi "T'f 7 declines to give any opinion, and I must wholly dis Am nhtrrvations of Mr. Justice Blackburn.

i rr.h.r nf raaea were cited to us in which the English Courts have exercised jurisdiction in respect or act done aoroaa. dj uni.r v. i.h rYmrt because ther were transi tory actions. Nevertheless, the want of a venue for trial was a difficulty in them, which was overcome by a fiction. But such fiction was never attempted to ba used in the real or local actions in which the Court had no jurisdiction.

Questions arising on ordinary or At .1. L.w. ilain hw rfiTTithr been mercantile i i Whether a dispute arising on a contract with regard to property or other right in land ought 'ever to have wen "teneu, nardwi'eke did entertain uch a dispute in "Peep Lord Baltimore (2 Smith' L.C.), disclaiming fnll inrisdietion to direct that the plain tiff should quietly hold. He founded the jurisdiction he did exercise upon the ground of a contract or aa equity between ue panica. i 7,1.

sion, which has been acted upon by other great Judges Equity, seems to mo to oo open riu. fnrt ia doinj indirectly what it dare not do directly, It seem to me uat ue decision breaks the comity ot national consent, because such a contract deals with rights resulting from the ownership of land. The one contracting party contract to yield right and the other party contract to accept rirhta rianltinc from the ownership of land. And by the consent of all nations, as I understand the matter, adisputeastosuehrights is among nations to be treated as action to be tried only in the mm rrt stftr. TV.

jht however, is no, material in tuc iittu ease wherein there is neither contract nor equity. As to the question whether this action can be treated as other than an action for a wrongful entry on land on the ground that only damages are ought, I can see no possibility of so holding. Damages cannot be asked for a being themlve a cause of action. none can seek damages on too carr entitled to damage and therefore claim damages. Damage is sometime stated to be a cause of action, but then damage mean injury.

Damage are one of the relief ked for a the compensation for aa in jury. But then ue injur; aa mw v. damage are the relief in respect of the cause of action. In such a case a the present, uerefore, th. cant, of action i the wrongful entry pa land, and that ia the only causa which can b.

relied on in order to support the claim foe damage. Th. cans, of actlon.uereiore. ia aiwitm. abroad and tha Court, therefore, cannot entertain the causa 'at all.

It cannot make a declaration. It cannot issue an injunction. It cannot award damage. TUplea not a dilatory plea, but a plea in bar. The Question whether Monbaxa can zaaka a valid concession or not it iaunaterial, inore especially if the nower to grant tuch a concession is recognized by to National executive.

I am of opiaion that 3 indigent of tha Divisional Court i right on aR jolnta. jta appeal must, ia my opinioiyba It not, I tar that any person who is in possession, of a country or region, and who exercises therein th. powers of ruler, and no other person assume to b. superior to him, is sufficiently to be vouched aa the nn 18, land la that eocmtrv or regions A to th. eontentio.

that th. Court of country can assume jurisdiction in respect ot extra A aver which, thrv have otherwise no juriaJietioa, on th. mere ground that if they do not the plaintiff ha no remedy anywhere, I am of oouuon th.t it doe not bAr axaaiinatlon. It ia claiming too the defendant fa resMeat i tW (wwwtry wMkaw tW lrtUctiea, and when tar. ta so Lairt as i wuisdietion in the Ue rti riUr.

It iJ this altered inherent ioriaHietloa ia re, we ad of I to land abroad ha before be. aiereiAad. It ia admitted also that, if it eiistcl, it could Bart hv. been exercised before 1873, when loeal vetwa war aholiahed by the Judicature Act of that year. Wa it not exercised because it did not exiat.

or baaa up to 1873 ther. wa technical iscedimewt to it axer ctse ia th. aha p. of local vena, ft This i th iav portsnt question to ba decided in thi esse. I do not propose to retrace ground so ably and fully occupied by the judgment which ha been delivered by ray brother Fry, or again to cite at lenjth ca upea which reliance ha been placed.

If thi were not a ca. of exceptional importance, I should be satiated by saying that I agree with th. views expressed ia th. judgment last delivered. I shall shortly five rj reA'in for the conclusion at which I have arrived.

believe th. Courts of thi country hay. and always had the inherent jurisdiction contended for to technical ml. of local venue. Th.

difficulties as to local actions tuch a trespas to land abroad being tried in the Court ot the realm arose from th. technical rules aa to th. necessity ia such cases for av local venu. a distinguished from any inherent want of jurisdiction ia our Courts to try them. All actions were originally local, aod whether they concerned matters movable or immovable property were only triable in ue locality in wmcn uey arose, ix to.

action arose out of England, were allowed to be tried within the jurisdictioa, an action of trespass to real property was held to be a local action, and consequently such an action in respect of land abroad could never be tried in any Court of th. nation. The King's Court exercised only a limited jurisdiction they were hemmed in on every side, and hampered ty xorzns ox actions. Eriuuii it uteir lunsuiciivii wa extended and came to be described as a universal and superintending jurisdiction, and for age past the Court have set up a a maxim uti jut ibi rt vudiv.rn so that it would not be wrong to assert that as against every one resident in England the Court of this country have jurisdiction in every ease ta wnicn they ought to hare jurisdictioa. With the, wider nd more intelligent views of the function of the Superior Court it i not wonderful to find that the question of jurisdiction in cases of trespass to land abroad tune under their notice.

RFirst it appears to hare come before Lord Ilardwicke. sitting in tb. Court of Chancery, which at that time had not renounced a lunsaiction to swira aamases. me case arose, according to Lord Mansfield' account of it, in. respect ol an injury to land in ue raii indies, out Lord Ilardwicke directed satisfaction to be mada in damages.

Lord Chief Justice Eyre overruled an objection to the jurisdiction in a similar ease, and in two action Lord Mansfield did the same. These cases gave rise to two questions 1) ought th. Courts' of this country on general principle to possess tne jurisdiction invoked ana (Zj, li yes, then ought the rule of procedure a regard the place of trial to be allowed any longer to stand in the way of the assertion of the jurisdiction These ease show that the three great Judge whom I have named thought tbat in inch case jurisdiction ought to be entertained by the Courts of this country and these cases show tbat th. two Chief Justices further thought that ue formal objection arising from ue aistincuon between local and transitory action ought to b. cast arid, as a worn out fetter.

The question came under review in the case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas," and though the action there was in respect of personal wrong only. Lord Mansfield dealt also with tha eases relating to injuries to' land. (Th. Lord Justice read Lord Mansfield' judgment in that case.

Knng instance oi sucn actions ot trespass to nd abroad which had been maintained before him.) It i obvious that the Court of King Bench (for all the Jsdge eoncurred in Lord Mansfield' decision) held that, as regard realty, the question wa whether th. proper judgment wa one which could b. en forced against tha land, in which case ue suit mutt be in tha focus rti tit ot. or was one for damage only, in which ease the plaintiff mizht follow th. person oi ue aeienaant.

Lora manineia men addressed himself to the formal distinction arising from ue mod. of trial, and then gave instance ol eases of loeal action for iniuries to real propertT abroad brought and maintained before himself. (The Lord Justice read the, passage from th. report in Cowper.) I have quoted: these passages because the cases mentioned by Aora Diamine kj are ta par swktw with the present and because it appear that the Court of King' Bench then entertained the, two pro positions that on general principles the jurisdiction in question ought to exist, and that' the formal difficulty a to venu. or place of trial ought to b.

rejected. In the case of Doulson r. Mathewt (4 Term Report) the Court of King' Beach, ia Lord Kenyan' time, refused to follow Lord Mansfield to the full extent, and held that an action for damage for trespass to land abroad could not lie. But th. judgment went rather on the technical uan tne substantial dimeulty, ana, a uo teennicai aimcurty ba swept away br the Judicature Act, ought not the doctrine of Lord Mansfield as regards the real distinction to be revived These cases have been considered in America by one of th.

greatest Judges of th. United State. Chief Justice Marshall, who adopted the opinion of Lord Kenyon a to the fetter on th. exercise of the jurisdiction, but th. opinion of Lord Mansfield as to the existence nf tha Inriadietlon.

unon enerAl principles. (Th. Lord Justice her. cited the caso of Livingston r. Jefferson." already cited by Lord Esher.) It is obvious that if the technical difficulties fas to venue) had been removed by legislation, as in England, it is the great authority of Chief Justice Marshall would have been in favour of asserting tho jurisdiction.

Th. judgment I have cited received the express approval of Lord Bramwall.ia "Whitaker r. Forbes (9 Q.B.D., 63). Another great American authority, Mr. Justice Storey, support th.

same view. Lord Mansfield a doctrine," he say, naa since Men overruled aa untenable, according to the actual jurisprudence of England, however maintainable it might be upon general principles of International law, if the suit were for personal damage only Storey on Conflict of Law," tec. 554). Again, the Supreme Uourt oi Aiouiiiana nave neia an action ma in tains uio against defendant resident ia Louisiana in respect of an injury to real estate doo. by them in the Stat, of Illinois Holmes r.

Barclay, vase in too Supreme Court of Louisiana," vol. 4, 63). Lastly. in Whitaker v. Forbes." be run before, but tried after, the Judicature Acts, the question are, whether the plaintiff coald recover against a defendant rest dent in this country arrears of a rent charge on land in Australia.

Jrd Blackburn empnasixea ue Distinction between jurisdictioa and venue, and said the ease did not raise a onestion of jurisdiction, but wa on of venue only, and th. judgment of the other member of the Court of Appeal were in th. same direction. The Court of Chancery ha always been free from any fetter at to ue mod or tnal and uat Court drew the limit of it jurisdiction as to matter relating to land abroad at the point where Lord Mansfield had drawn it, where tne power of the Court ceased. The Court, therefore, could not entertain a suit for partition of land abroad because th.

Court could not award a commission into a country nor effectually order possession to be given ia pursuance of its decree, ana tor a like reason it would not decree possession of land in Scotland. But where tha relief sous lit 1 onlr MTsonal tha Court ha not hesitated to act on th. person in respect ot lands abroad. Contract have been executed, trust en forced, foreclosure decreed, and fraud relieved arainit. all in reference to land abroad.

The. case havs bean maintained upon the doctrine that equity acts against the person so does a judgment for damage. In a ease like the present, where, according to the plaintiffs' statements, there are no Court of adequate jurisdiction in the locui rti titcc, it i obvious that to repel the jurisdictioa i to produce a total failure of justice. If neither Africa nor England afford a forum the plaintiff is remediless. But suppose the Portuguese Court have jurisdiction if their iTitrm ba like our those Court would have no power over the defendants unless they had a residence or property within the Portuguese dominions, and so long a this is not the case, and it may be io for ever, the plaintiff are without remedy, ror these reason I think that the abolition of the local venue fnr tha trial of anv action has removed the formal difficulty in the way of trying here an action for iaa ana mat ucra is now nouung tmnssa to I arid abro; ty, withdraw tha rasa from the penenl rule of Inter national law that the plaintiff shall seek relief ia the forum of the defendant's residence, and that the Court, therefore, ought to entertain jurisdiction ia this case so far a it relates to the claim for damage for trespass to the land in the possession of the plaintiffs i and if the case ought to be heard on that question it i obvious that the question of injunction to prevent further damage ought to tod over until the trial.

A question may, perhaps, hereafter arise a to whether there can be a tort to immovable estate according to the laws of a eountry where there is no Panrt AaMuate to deal with it. On thi Question I express no opinion as it cas no been argnea. nitn regard to so much of the defence a relie on the authority of th. Chief Mutassa as a justification for the act complained of, it appear to me that the production of th. document entered into by that chief wntn in.

appczuca note ox ajctu aoauiwa, oo Secretary of State, ia snfficient prtma foci re cognition of th. sovereign right oz uat unci la make it crooer to leave tha point open for farther consideration at the trial of this action. Loss Jcstick Loris then delivered a written judgment to tb. like affect, la favour oi th plain tiffs. It was in the, term So snocb of th.

state ment of claim as twcka a declaration of the plaintiff's titl. to tb. land la question and aa injunction restraining th. defendant from interfering therewith ha bean abandoned. But tha plaintiff contend that they entitled to maintain mach or ueir Clam a teaks danvage for a tnspass ta tboir land, aad aa io junction to restrain th defendant frota eontinaiag and repealing tuch trespas.

Th. lhn for a dwclra tion oi titl la abandoned, because th. Court in thi country eoold not eafore. tdvair judgment or dear, wham tha land is aitnat. ant of the rurisdievioai the claim for breaking aad catering tbe a lais tiffs' land it maintained because it I eoaUodcd that tho Court of thi country have aa inherent jsunadietioa to try aa action for trespass to land abroad ta jsrrisaaat, whe which could only happen ia on.

particular place. transitory matters tho plaintiff might lay hi venu. where he pleased, aad the defendant was bound to follow it, unless his defence consisted of some matter which in its nature was local. With regard to transitory matters abroad the difficulty' was obviated by a fiction. The creation of a fiction, however.

eouM not give jurisdiction, unless jurisdictioa had but th. creation of a fiction could, as it did, remova the fetter imposed by the technical rule of local venue. Tbe rule, however, with regard to local venna in respeet to local matters continued down to 1873, when local venues were abolished Trespas ta land was a local action, and no aetioa ia respect to land abroad could be tried in our Courts before that date. I presume tha same fiction might have been adopted with regard to local matters abroad, as was adopted with regard to transitory matters abroad, provided thai defendant was resident within th. juris diction, and th.

remedy was ta pcrsoaaat. It was. however, not thought deirabl. to extend th. fiction to matters loeal th.

local venu. with regard to matter local no doubt had its advantages it waa convenient that th. jurors summoned should hav. soma now ledge of the locut in quo, it was convenient for the purpose of a view, and other reason might b. suggested which would account for th.

retention of th. local venu. when it had been relaxed in matte ra transitory. Although the defendant might bo within th. jurisdiction, and the remedy sought against him! have been a remedy i ptrioimm.

so long aa the local' venu. existed it wa impossible for tho common law Court to entertain actions for trespass to land abroad. I cannot doubt, however, but that ther. wa an inherent dormant jurisdiction in our Court, fettered and controlled only by the local venue, to try actions for trespas to lands abroad. Th.

non requirement of local venue in matter transitory, coupled with to. fiction, had liberated tb. jurisdiction, aad enabled our Court to try matter abroad not subject to local venue where a ni table remedy could be enforced against th. person. Why should not the abolition of local venue nave the same operation ia matters when th.

defendant is within tho jurisdictioa and th.1 remedy recovery of damages is enforaeabl. against his person Action for assault and battery, would 'lie although committed abroad, and defendant may have justified by pleading; a trespass on hi land abroad by th. plaiatiff, aad a' removal of tha nlaintiff therefrom on that as count. Why not action for trespass to land abroad now that the fetter of tha local venue 1 removed They both sound" in damages, and the remedy is enforceable against tha person. Why should ther.

b. jurisdictioa in the on. ease and not in th. other Aa action, again, for breach of contract ia respect of land abroad would lie against a defendant resident within th. inrisdietion.

although auestion of tho most intricate kind might incidentally aria, with regard to such. land. Court of equity unfettered by local venno entertained suits affecting lands abroad. They decreed' specific performance of article concerning boundariea abroad, they foreclosed mortgage ot land abroad, they enforced trusts aad relieved against fraud abroad. They seem only to have stayed their hand when they were unable to enlore.

th. suitable remedy. ao ion; aa tb. relief sought waa personal they have unhesitatingly interfered. Row can thi action of the Court of equity be explained, unless ther possessed aa inherent jurisdiction to entertain such matter, when they had Ppwer to enforce their decisions against a person witoxn tne jurxsaictionr in mew rinanoMKn i difficult to understand why aa action for treapasa to laad will not lie.

I believe th. true principle to be, now that tb. fetter of loeal vena, is removed, that the tjourt oi ui realm nav. junsaietina to try an causes of action arising abroad when tbe defendant i within th. jurisdictioa, aad Courts hen? can giv.

effect to their jurisdiction by applying the suitable remedy but that where they cannot apply th. suitable remedy in ejectment, partition of land, and other sucn cases they bar. no jurisdiction. because they are powerles. to enforce a remedy.

I find no cas. inconsistent with this view and maar airthoritative expressions ia favour of it. (Tho Lord Justice cited th. Authentic already quoted by Lord Justice Fry.) I am of opinion, that th. plaintiffs el aim lor trespasses to iana can a.

entertained, and I am unable to agree with the Court below in this respeet. A declaration of titl. and injunction to enforce it was abandoned by th. plain tiff. It is unnecessary, therefore, to express soy opinion on that part of th.

case. A to th. question raised by th. plea justifying under Mutassa. I think a tunieient prima arte caso nas uee.

asm cms to entitle tha defendants to hav. that question triad. Tha formal order drawn op waa then read. It recited the plaintiff' abandonment of their claim fol a declaration of their title, aad as to that it th. judgment, but aa to th.

residue of th. claim it declared that tha High Court had jurisdictioa. Accordingly, unless ther. is an appeal to th. Lord.

the esse will be tried. XYBCXO T. BAWDSLAAB. This was an action tried before Mr. Justice A.

L. Smith and a jury to recover possession of a gold enamelled snuff box or for damages for trover. 'Th. plaintiff, who wa an art dealer, purchased the snuffbox for 130, and he agreed to allow on. Fraakenheim, also aa art dealer, to hav.

a half interest in th. box for 65, (object to th. plaintiff having th. possession of th. box aad th.

selling of it. Th. plaintiff stated that dis gave the snuff box. with other article, to Frankennetm to take to Christie to sola, ana th. jury found that Frankhenheim pledged hi half share in tha snuff box with th.

defendant a for money due from him to tha defendant. Th. learned Judge held upon this finding that Fraakenh.iat,j as part owner of the anasT box, could pledge hist undivided moiety, tad that th. plaintiff could ooK maintain an action against an. ucicxxians so rewtfc th.

box without paring off th. amount of th. chaxf sk to th. extent of Fraakenheim' half share and, further, that th. special contract between the nlaintiff and Fraakenheim that the plaintiff should retain possession of the saua box did not give say right Of action against the defendant.

He accordingly gava judgment for the defendant. (See 8 Tkt Tint Law Report, 395.) The plaintiff appealed. Mr. Willis, Q.C.. aad Mr.

Fillat, ror tho plaintiff, contended that the ml. of law that ona joint owner of a chattel could sell or charge (hare in the chattel aod deliver possession did not apply ia this esse. Her. Fraakenheim became joint owner subject to th. express condition in the original contract that the plaintiff should have and retain possession of the an off box.

Fraakenheim, therefore. never was cmitica to or naa possession vi uiv uua, except for the specific purpose of taking it to Christie's. The plaintiff, therefore, being entitled to the possession, could maintain an action of detioaa against Fraakenheim, and uerefore against th. defendant, who could stand ia no better position than Fraukenheixn. A person entitled, to possession) could maintain aa action of detinue even as against tb.

true owner Robert r. Wystt," 2 2C8 Brierley v. Kendall." 17 Q.K, 937 Gordon r. Harper," 7 T.R., 9). They al contended that unity of possession was essential to joint tenancy or tenancy in common, anu as uiem was trj unity nx possession here, neither a joint tenancy nor a tenancy' in common waa created.

Praakenheim had only a. contractual interest. right to take half ta. pro ceeds arising from the tale or tne iuub oox. Mr.

W. n. Clay, for th. defendant, contended that tha true position of Frsnkenheim wa that h. wa part owner ot the box, with a certain agreement annexea tut vara Aisautcnncim picusjcu.

ebb oox witu the defendant he passed the property ia his share to tha defendant without any agreement annexed to it. Th. agreement was from the nature of the thins; personal to Fraakenheim. The agreement could not. affect Frankenheim'a right of property at moat tha plaintiff eoald only sua Frsnkenheim nsou th.

coo tract. The plaintiff could net so. him in detinue. rraaJtenheua naa merely connwUed a breaofc of contract. The action of detinue would not lie uni est founded upon sons, right of property.

Mere poaiesiioa waa aos sumciest s. Tb. CotTET. ha vine taken tiat. to cmaiiilir.

delivered judgment this lavsratBg allowiag tea aafstal. a WIB JWKt STAY said tfcat ah. quesAtau waa whether the pUtnattT could maintain Jf adhered to what was said ia 8wlwyn' Mii fiiud and in Sullen aad Leak, that aay ierM w. aad? a right to tho ismedtaz. poaitBtia.

of founded noon speeial or sacral aii nitH dttiail. Dad ta. plsaalltT shea, stay if aafj special Tsrosaerty ia Tisiik i aaiiia' heat It waa, said tfcaa tatre waa a. taasnsy ta )waswsa wo, tea box oecasst. Ftaaae tscl slaiastaVs 1 ynsienisa rraakiaassuw wa awt eajtla) ta Tha I waa apt iniatsV 1W issawss ws rhoA of asssiiif Fraakcnsvataa, aad at ismnt li i waaaywi sion, at.

(ia. Lanl stis.) lisaHni raVa wfmaj tut to thai aW jliiaaif If fWjfwj a kavra waa tawat WsjmW coatra to bar. pssswaaiasj aad aasvt: ass waa aa Th. true tonslwslwa.