Independent from Long Beach, California • 29

iT Tv Ltin di, cw. nt Oct, INDEPEhibENT (AM) PRESS-TELEGRAM (PM)-M 11 I. i i- i-i I .1 I By CHARLES MOHR New York Tinea Newa Service begun to attack and neutralize Sam missile sites in the immediate area. thinly spaced waterline Israeli strongpoints on the eastern bank were hopelessly outnumbered, but this does not diminish the courage and drive that the Egyptian army showed in overpowering or bypassing them. the city of Suez, and the southern, mouth of the canal.

Time was a principle enemy by this stage because the Israelis were convinced that pressures os a 7 cease-fire would mount rapidly as Egypt and the Soviet Union saw the trap closing around the Egyptian force on the southern part of the', ilans did and did not do. One is that the failure to concentrate their forces in one part of the front made 1 it possible for the thin screen of Israel's regular army forces to contain the'Egyptians. They also suggest a theory that revolves around the. unusually heavy Egyptian reliance on Soviet-; made missue weapons. claims to have destroyed or disabled 200 or more Egyptian tanks, about one fifth of the number that had been brought across the canal.

It was at this point that the Egyptians decision to spread their forces thinly all dong the east bank began to influence the battle, sources said. Israelis say that within the narrow Egyptian foothold there was little room to maneuver. They also assert that the Egyptians were totally exposed to visual observation. When they moved, Israeli forces could deploy to meet them head on and could also drive in from the flanks, a source said, adding They almost tended to outflank themselves. But then the Egyptian forces of the signifi- failed to reach any cant, military objectives that lay just a few miles ahead of them, particularly key road junctions and the entrances to passes through the rugged Sinai Mountains that parallel most of the length of the Had they done so, said one source here.

Israels efforts to move up pplies and her quickly mobilized reserves would have been monstrously complicated. INSTEAD OF racing for the asses and concentrating her. what Israelis call a spearpoint, Egypt spread her -big force out in a narrow corridor along the arid land on the eastern bank of the canal south of the town of Qantara. There is disagreement in Israel as to the explanation for this. Some people think that Egyptian Presi dent Anwar El-Sadat never intended to fight a decisive war to crush Israel, but instead meant only to seize the canal banks and hold them until an internationally imposed cease-fire stopped the fighting and left him in possession of a major political prize.

Others, particularly profession-i, doubt that this explana- al soldiers, tion is valid and say that the great attack that Egypt launched a week later, on Sunday, Oct 14, proves their point. They offer a number of other explanations for what the Egyp-. THIS CREATED a narrow gap in the air cover umbrella that the SAMs had furnished, said a source. It took skill tp operate in that free space but our air force did so. News reports from Washington have indicated that to the next few days the Israeli planes used newly American smart bombs electronically guided to attack' more SAM sites and widen the hole to the sky.

Israeli ground, forces also participated in the race to overrun such Some Israeli, sources are con-. vinced that the. Egyptians failed to read the battle correctly that they were slow to grasp the significance of what the Israelis were-attempting or to learn fully how rapidly" the bridgehead aefoss the canal was growing to numbers of troops and to size. THE BEST SOLUTION for the Egyptians was to try to use their large forces east of the canal to attack from both north and south and pinch off and seal the corridor of Israeli-held ground leading to the eastern side of the bridges, analysts said. They did try this but they had to come right down that -narrow strip along the canal, said one Israeli.

In this war our tanks had already learned a lot about how to stop them when they come at us. Also while one of our units could stand 'in their path other units could hit them on the flanks. Some of the battles that ensued were, classic text-book affairs. Israel herself had to place some limitations on the objectives of her offensive. 1 It would have been ideal for her to have been able to push out both north and-south from the bridgehead and thus trap the entire Egyptian force east of the canal.

However, a verdant belt of corn fields, trees, reeds and brush growth! tog along a fresh-water canal lay across the path to the north of the town of Ismailia hampering tank erations. Israeli troops moved about 20 miles deep into Egypt to the west and up to the Ismailia-Cairo road to the north. BUT THE MAIN mobile force swung south and headed first for the two main roads from Cairo, to This did, in fact, happen. First the Soviet Union hurriedly invited Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to Moscow where agreement was reached on a cease-fire proposal 7 Israel had little choice and accepted the cease-fire.

When it went into effect to the evening last Monday, Oct 22, Israeli forces were still about nine miles north of Suez City. They were astride the main roads to Cairo but a subsidiary road that' madeST loop "southland pf Suez to join the main roads was uncoveredT So was the small port several miles south of Suez on thq! Red Sea. The Egyptian III Corps was virtually isolated but the trap was not entirely closed. ISRAEL CONTENDS that the Egyptians violated the cease-fire on Tuesday, Oct. 23, an attempt -to open the main roads.

Israeli units then drove into the outskirts of Suez and well south of the city on the Red Sea coast, eorktog the bottle. The gravity of this was so -great to Egypt that Sadat asked for a joint United States-Soviet ceasefire supervision force, and the world was dragged into a day of uneasy confrontation as the United States went on a state of alert and the Russians to keep out. -Within nine days after her initial canal crossing, Israel had transformed a static front and a stalemate into an offensive so successful that it may still be found diplomatically unacceptable to the world as a whole. tv V' I' 7 v- v. rv .1.

'V THE EGYPTIANS made some advances, on I almost think our tankers were too trigger-happy, said a. source. If the Egyptians had crome further" it would have been preferable. As it was, the Israelis chose to open their offensive across, the canal almost immediately after the violence of the Egyptian push sub-raetis think contrib- sided, which Israel uted to surprise and to the effectiveness of their operation. Israel has still not revealed in how her forces got across the canal, and press censorship, tends to limit a full account.

It is believed by foreign observ- ers, however, that a large force of' Israeli infantiy was. inserted on the sideofthe canal mostly by helicopters. This force quickly seized a narrow part of the west bank-just north of the Great Bitter Lake. At about the same time a relatively small but powerful unit of Israeli tanks ana armored cars also reached the west bank in the same area. They moved across by barges and pontoons in a miniature amphibious operation.

Meantime, a strong force of Israeli armor and other troops accompanied by combat engineers drove a narrow, corridor through the Egyptian lines east of the canal and reached the bank opposite the Egyptian infantry holding the bridgehead on the west bank. A bridge was thrown across the water, despite heavy Egyptian shelling, and then others were set in place. i small Israeli tank force on the western bank had already spread out, accompanied by elite mechanized, infantry, and hud jct f-m s-v' and you By BEN ZINSER MedleaMMeaee Editor TEL AVIV On the fourth day of the 1973 Middle East war an Israeli general warned his nation not to expect an elegant" victory, but the military operation that concluded the war may be remembered as one. Israeli military thinkers and others have started to study the conduct of the war and have begun to reach conclusions that are debatable but are also provocative. One is that the qualitative gap" between the Israeli, and the Arab forces has not been dangerously narrowed since the 1967 six-day war.

ANOTHER IS that the priority Egyptian generals gave to political and psychological objectives lured them into a catastrophic deployment of their troops that helped Israel, finally, to find way to fight the sortiif offensive battle she Still another is that Arab tactical innovations that caused serious Israeli losses early in the war such as the intense use of SAMs or surface-to-air missies as a substitute for air cover in the end seemed to limit the Arabs flexibility and to some extent to shackle their armies. i Israelis themselves are by no means in full agreement, but there is one capsule record of the fight- it mat ing and lessons drawn from several qualified sources are generally agreed upon: The Egyptian crossing of the canal on the afternoon of Oct. 6 was very well planned, rehearsed executed. Troops manning te special type of hard candy obese woman who may help the wants to-reduce, according to a new medical report. Drs.

Charles W. McClure and Charles A. Brusch of the Medical Research Center, Cambridge, say the candy contains glu-; cose (sugar), benzocaine (a local anesthetic), caffeine and vitamins. V. A weight-reduction program in- volving this cdndy was set up as follows: Whenever a patient had the urge to snack, she ate one of the.

hard candies. Also, the patient was told to eat 7 one candy at a time from 15 to 30 minutes before meals. In addition, a patient was permitted to eat one after completing a meal if she still was hungry. Emphasis was placed on elimi-" nating all traditional snacking, but patients were allowed to have up to 15 diet candies each day. A total of 308 patients partied Jated in a study comparing the ollowing weight-reduction pro-.

grams: Use -of the stimulant drug "dextroamphetamine sulfate. Use of nonprescription dietary preparations. Willpower. A plan using sugar-only candies. And a plan using the special' hard candy.

Fifty-three of 62 patients taking' the special candy completed a four-week trial of the program. This group lost more than twice as much weight by the end of the trial than did all other patients, com-r bined. The averagerweekly losrof thr: v.Up at the lake this summer, we returned home from dinner out one evening, to find a dozen youngsters fitting on the living-room floor playing silly games. What pleased me immensely to see this sight was the fact that their ages ranged from nine up to 19. Testifying not long ago before a Senate subcommittee on social problems, Dr.

Margaret Mead, toe distinguished anthropologist, re-ked that (me of the most criti- marl IHedldne m. r. s' -t s- 7, S'-'- iXj. 1 i -s "Our winning team has always been the use of tactical air and tanks together, said an Israeli. Instead of using the planes of their air force as cover, the Egyptians before this war installed great numbers of SAMs along the-west bank of the canal.

THU WORKED quite well at first, he added. There was such a forest of missiles that we could, not use our planes the way we 'like. But there were also disadvantages for the Egyptians. The umbrella furnished by the SAMs extended only about 15 to 2Q miles, and they could not move fast without moving out from under the umbrella. This source also remarked that the Egyptians made effective use of wire-guided anti-tapk missiles operated by infantry units butthat this also prevented rapid and flexible movement because their armor could not get ahead of their infantry.

In any case, the canal front became static in the first days of the war. That permitted us to take care of Syria, said one source. Israelis insist that they always viewed the Syrian military threat as a Secondary one. But in the first hours of the war, the Syrian army had overrun much of the plateau of the Golan Heights and approached within few miles of the edge of the heights overlooking Israeli population centers. On the Egyptian front we had the whole Sinai behind us but on the Syrian front we had no strate gic depth, an authoritative source said.

We took care of that ISRAELS NORTHERN command first pushed the Syrians back to the 1967 cease-fire line in what a source called "simply bloody fight-. ing: nothing very But on Thursday, Oct 11, the Israelis punched through the northern sector of the Syrian lines and within two days occupied a sizable salient of Syrian territory. Israel itself then halted the advance and for the rest of the war countered Syrian, Iraqi and, eventually, Jordanian probes and thrusts. As almost full attention revert- ed to the Egyptian front, generals seemed to face a series of unattractive to fact, unaccept-ablC choices. -7, v-1 It was considered unacceptable to the Egyptians in full possession of the east bank of the canal.

And, said a source, if we had merely cleaned them jmt of the east bank we would have left Egyptian aggression unpunished. Also, we simply could not allow, pur-selves to be drawn into a bloody battle of attrition with casualties that would be unacceptable to us. Israel began to refine and prepare her plan to overcome the dilemma by crossing to the west bank of the canal, splitting the Egyptian army and encircling part of it. Oh Sunday, Oct. 14 the Suez alb front came alive again.

The Egyptian forces east of toe canal, which had grown from five to eight divisions, initiated major tank battles -along much of the front One theory is that the Egyptians were merely trying to ease pressure on their retreating Syrian allies in the north by tying down or diverting Israeli forces. But at least some well-placed observers toink the Egyptian intentions were more ambitious to begin to roll up toe carpet to a general advance. The Sunday battle is described as a slugging match in which Israel older both; when such support is only bya missing, sdciety is bound hostile symbiosis. group taking the special candy was about two pounds. The report is to the Journal of the American Medical Womens Association, and a summary -appears to Modern Medicine.

V. Crash dieting can sometimes 7 cause serious mental disturbances, doctors warn. -1 7' Two psychiatrists from Hebrew 7 University, medical school report on 10 persons treated to a Jerusalem hospital. The patients lost 110 to 240 pounds to intensive crash diets. Vv Nine of the.

10 developed such severe mental symptoms that hospitalization was necessary. The reporting in the journal Archives of General Psy- chiatry, say: Great care should be taken to the prescribing of diets, especially i to patients with an unstable person-. ality structure. The degree of mental. illness was directly related to the duration and severity of the diet, the re-- searchers say.

Their emotional upsets included depression, delusions, auditory hallucinations, insomnia, 1 restlessness and decreased sexual potency. One -severely depressed -patient committed suicide after losing 60 pounds to eight weeks of 7 rigid dieting. '7 Six of tiie 10 patients had no record of previous mental illness. "Depression was the most common problem. Practically all of the patients showed improvement to their mental state when they dietii and began to regain their norma rweight, the researchers report ial 'V 3- and sister, usually with disastrous results, rather than being content to be and do what.

is proper for a-given age group. (Of course, even when I was young we all yearned to be older and be able to do things not now permitted; but this yearning was also coupled with much r. satisfaction to doing childish things as well.) 7 7-. 1 -7 7 7 IS eontiaam, not a dis- 4 crete series of breaks; 19. must remember what it was like to be nine, just as 39 must remember 7 what it was like -to be 19.

Our sympathies range' forward and backward to if sdciety is going to have any cohesion (and any ongoing satisfaction). We have 7 already lost our grandparents (in 7 the 19th-century sense of knowing them), and we are on the way toward losing our parents in any emotionally supportive wayf 7 But ages exists within their own. boundaries; it is a delusion to suppose they can. Each needs support from younger and the intervening, decades, our society tended more to become fissured to where 16-year-olds or 14- or 12-year-olds became within their own narrow age aspiring toward the older looking down their noses at the -'U7: ages are traditionally sup-! to form links, not, barriers; learn appropriately from us if they refuse to nythtog 1 and if tiie social goal is to older than part to ai up Xs fast as possible -to of freedom and autonomy. accelerating compartment cal defects to modern America is the compartmentalization of age groups, so that people tend to.

as-X0 sociate only with others to their, '-same age bracket with a lost same age Alh however, and more the point year-olds locked group, and younger. But posed we cannot kids, 7. thoie take grow terms The tatization of our tipie has resulted in the teeny-bopper who obscenely tries to imitate his older, brother sense of sympathy and understand-; i the i ing between I i generations. THIS IS TRUE among -young people today, to a way it wasnt when I was young. The scene to the u- living-room that night carried me back to my own childhood to the 1920s, when my cousins and I and our friends all played together during the summers, from the first- graders up to the college students, without1 any.

hint of. condescension or loss of status. 1 1 's 1 i I- rr 1 -r.