The Cincinnati Enquirer from Cincinnati, Ohio • Page 46

i-ii (iNfiNNAii kmm'Ihi'k Siini.iy. tan 12, nr: Annual Conference On International Affairs ie boviet union Can U.S. And Allies Influence Future Foreign And Security Policies? Forces At i OF 111 I ii If Premier Kosyqin, left; President Podqorny, center, and Communist Chief Brezhnev. U.S., Allies Must Set A Course Civilian Band ii May Day parade is a switch. Factors Affecting USSR Policx Panel No 2 Panel No.

3 Saville R. Davis, moderator, former Washington Bureau Chief, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Dr. Wolfgang Leonhard, Mander-scheid, Federal Republic of Germany, and Yale University Dr. Peyton V. Lyon, School of International Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa Miss Fay Willey, Associate Editor, Newsweek, New York Herbert Okun, director, Office Of Soviet Union Affairs, U.

S. Department Of State. By BRADY BLACK Editor of The Enquirer The forthcoming world championship chess match between Bobby Fischer, the American challenger, and Boris Spas-sky, the Russian champion, is symbolic of the world competition today between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the greater competition of government against government, President Nixon made a move in his trip to Peking to meet with the Chinese leaders whioh set the world experts on the Soviet Union off on a speculative tangent directed to figuring out what the Russian countermove may be. This consideration spiced discussions Friday at the 18th Annual Conference on International Affairs held at the Cincinnati Convention Center.

The topic, as has been the record in the past of the sponsoring Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, was a hot world subject. It was: "The Soviet Union in The Seventies; whri; can its internal dynamics and foreign policies mean for the United States and our allies?" Elsewhere on this page are discussed for Enquirer readers how experts on Russia from U. S. government, education and industry and experts from Berlin, Paris, Glasgow and Ottawa looked at the question from three different perspectives of inquiry. FOR AN OVERVIEW, I talked with Dr.

Alexander Dallin, professor of history and political science, Stanford University, who presided at the conference. He, incidentally, was keen about the spinoff for him from the coming together in Cincinnati of so many thought leaders on Russia at such a propitious time. Mr. Nixon, in going to China and then scheduling for May a visit, to Moscow, seemed to be strengthening the lesser of the two major Communist powers in the differences between the two and thereby posing some important questions for the Russians of what they should do. It is a sensible strategy but one which requires a subtlety in foreign affairs for which the United States does not have a noteworthy record, Dr.

Dallin thought. He reasoned that there must be three types of approach under debate in the USSR, with the dominant one that of continuing to Inch westward. He saw as the next in size a sort of Russia-First group and the smallest as the neo-military, who would argui to outbid Mao and step up help for North nam. THE BIG ACT IN the center ring of the world circus today is a triangle, with the United States, Russia and China each trying to prevent the two others' getting a leg up. Russia, Dr.

Dallin surmises, is compelled to see the new turn in U. relations as a reality which nothing Russia can say will dispel. He sees signs of confusion in Russia as reflected by comment in the controlled Russian press in terms of the Nixon visit to Peking as, on the one hand, a sell-out and, on the other, as statesmanlike and normalizing. The American view of Russia, once that of a colossuj which knew what it was doing and must be up to something if we couldn't figure it out, has changed, Dr. Dallin pointed out.

Russia now is seen as having a collective leadership, old in years, divided as to directions and priorities and not at all certain of its course. THIS MAKES FOR CAUTION, but a caution directed to at least parity in military strength. Despite this growth, Dr. Dallin fees, Russia isn't quite sure what to do with its power now that it has achieved it. One example of caution is the situation in the Middle East, where there has been belligerent talk but an apparent restraint by Russia on Egypt.

The Russians, in paying more attention to agriculture and development of their economy, have shown a heightening interest u. S. technology and management methods. It is as if, Dr. Dallin said, they are wondering how, once an order is given, they can be sure that it will be carried out.

The inching westward, he feels, offers interesting potential for Russia In countering China's move toward the United States. He sees the real options for U.S. Chinese trade as miner, whereas there are rather large opportunities between Russia and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Western the United States and Japan on the other. This type of development, if pushed, could allow Russia to elbow China aside and enhance the kind of development toward which the Soviets seem to have been leaniing. By SCOTT AIKEN Enquirer Foreign News Analyst The Russians believe they are in a "long-term" struggle with both China and the West, according to panelist Dr.

Richard Lowenthal. The chief immediate concern of the Soviet leadership is, however, to avoid "too much conflict" with both hostile forces at once. Lowenthal argues that since the Chinese Communists are unwilling to come to agreements with the Soviet Union, the Russians are interested in "some partial agreements" with the United States and West Europe. He expressed a view generally shared by other members of the panel discussing the foreign and security policies of the Soviet because of their outlook on the world, the Russians are determined to play a global role and have the military power to carry it out that at least equals that of the United States. Dr.

Thomas Wolfe added that the "national security faction" in the Soviet Union wields major influence In the contest for power within the Soviet leadership. THE PROGRAMS OF Soviet buildup in nuclear-armed missiles, both on land and in submarines, are a result all the more difficult to turn off, he said. There is also a "lot of institutional inertia" in the heavily bur-eaucratized Soviet system, he" said, that makes it difficult for the Russians to stop a program once it is underway. (Both these factors will affect President Nixon in his efforts to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit the Soviet-American nuclear arms race. The President has made it clear that he hopes the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will have progressed far enough by the time of his May trip to the Soviet Union to bring agreement at least on restricting deployment of antiballis-tic missiles.) In Europe, the panelists said, the Soviet Union was interested in getting agreement on the status quo division between its empire and West Europe.

The Russians seek this partly to free themselves to deal with China. THE RUSSIANS continue also to desire greatly to get Western acceptance of their sphere of influence in East Europe. Lowenthal said this Western acceptance was one gain the Russians saw for themselves in their treaty with the West German government of Chancellor Willy Brandt. The West Berlin professor said that on the other hand the Soviet agreement on guarantees for. the city's ties with West Germany was an advantage for the West.

The panelists warned against substantial unilateral U. S. reduc- By DR. VINCENT DAVIS Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. Two central facts of utmost im-portance will characterize the world of the 1970s, according to the members of Panel III.

First, the Soviet Union continues to thrust outward with ambitious foreign policy goals. Second, the United States appears to be in a mood of withdrawal and reduction in overseas involvements. Although the stark bipolar period of intense Cold War confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union for a quarter of a century after World War II has now ended, this does not mean that these only two nuclear giants are on the verge of becoming friends and allies. On the contrary, the USA and the USSR will remain adversaries locked in competition with each other for the foreseeable future. Soviet-American relations will often be hostile in the 1970s, but limited areas of common interest will produce certain carefully drawn agreements and apparent co-operation.

The main area of common interest is the avoidance of nuclear conflict, which will contribute to the probable emergence of some kind of agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The Soviet Union and the United States also have some forms of complementary interests, such as the Soviet need for scientific and technological assistance 1 e-mented by the U.S. need to export more goods and services in international trade. A result could be, for example, U.S. government permission for the Mack Truck Co.

to build and operate plants in the Soviet Union. The So viet-American relationship will be further complicated in the 1970s by the fact that other nations and groups of nations such as China, Japan and Western Europe have gained various important forms of strength and are playing significantly larger international roles. The panelists agreed, however, that it is decidedly premature to say the we have a five-major-power multipolar world, although there is a slight trend in this direction. Fay Willey, noted various forms of internal strain, stress and tension within the Soviet Union, but she emphasized that ideological dynamics will continue to put pressure on Soviet leaders to justify their faith by pursning ambitious international goals. Wolfgang Leon-hard strongly supported this point, adding that Soviet leaders will remain successful in putting top priority on these foreign policy goals even in the face of internal problems such as economic weaknesses.

THE PANELISTS WERE less fully in agreement in reviewing Soviet foreign policy achievements in the 1960s. Herbert Okun used the term "a mixed -bag." Peyton V. Lyon, suggested that the Soviet Union As far as the average Russian is concerned, the panelists agreed that he is non-political. "When everything is politics, there is no politics," Nove quipped. "Most people are solely concerned with earning their daily bread," Tatu said.

"They don't have time for or interest in poll-tics." SOME DIFFERENCE Of opinion developed over the question of what might happen when the present leadership, most of whom are now in their late 60's, leaves the scene. Nove argued that there would be little if any change, that the new breed, having been brought up in same system, would follow pretty much the same line. Tatu, on the other hand, contended that new people at the top would tend to change personnel down the line. These new people would have different styles of doing things, different ways of looking at problems which eventually would mean some policy changes. Dealing with the role of pressure groups inside the Soviet leadership, the four panelists felt that Dr.

William E. Griffith, moderator, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dr. Richard Lowenthal, Free University of Berlin. William Ilyland, staff member, Na tional Security Council, Washington Dr. Thomas Wolfe, staff member, The Rand Corporation, Washington tions of its armed forces in Europe.

They felt such action would cast doubt both in West Europe and in the Soviet Un ion on the willingness of the Unit ed States to defend the region against the Russians. Wolfe stressed the concerns the Russians themselves have about cutting back their own forces in East Europe. "The Soviets were very gravely scared by the Polish riots of December, 1970," Griffith agreed. The strikes by Polish workers brought about the downfall of Communist Party First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka. THE PANELISTS SAID the So viet Union was concerned by the rapprochement undertaken China and the United States.

In their view, the Russians themselves were in good part responsible for Chinese interest in the overtures made by President Nixon. "The Soviets felt they had to intimidate China," Wolfe said. "Ironically, the Soviet Union Is partially responsible for the danger it feels from China," Dr. William Griffith noted. "They put one million troops on the Chinese border.

It was the greatest blunder the Soviets have committed." IN DISCUSSING SOVLET relations with tiie West the panelists were most concerned with the increasing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean basin and in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. Lowenthal said the Russians might be tempted "to use a pincers against the Persian Gulf area" to control the oil resources there that are so vital to West Europe. The panelists urged that the United States make clear to the Soviet Union how seriously it regarded the situation in the Middle East and South Asia. cerned internal forces that affect Mos ow-Pekmg relations as much if not more, than relations between Moscow and the West. For example discussing historical events that still play a role in Soviet thinking, Dr.

Richard Pipes described the Tartar conquest of medieval Russia as crucial. First, because it blocked the development of a true feudal system, which in the West led to the growth of a system of laws that even the most authoritarian rulers recognized. In Russia, however, no such legal system took root, he added. There, laws have always served simply to support the system and those who controlled it. Only now is there appearing some recognition of the concept that the law should protect individual rights.

The Tartar conquest also is at the root of what panel members described as fear of the Chinese among Russians, which was likened to the "Yellow Peril" scare in this country in the early years of this century. This has tended to sharpen the had more failures than successes in Western Europe. Saville Davis, indicated his opinion that the underdeveloped nations of the so-called "Third World" had proven themselves more successful than we expected in resisting various Soviet penetration efforts. But Willey suggested that Soviet leaders are "congratulating themselves" for numerous foreign policy triumphs in the past decade, and Leonhard enumerated what he regards as dramatic Soviet successes in four places: the Middle East, India, Western Europe and the "Third World." In contrast to these four major gains, he cited only one significant Soviet setback: the emergence of China as an adversary rather than a dominated ally. What should u.

S. policies be in the 1970s, in response to these Soviet developments? There was general agreement that the U.S. had "over-reacted" to the USSR in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but now the U.S. is dangerously "under-reacting. U.S.

allies, especially in Western Europe, are unhappy about American neo-isolationism but tend to follow the U.S. example by reducing their own international posture toward the USSR too. Leonhard contended that Western Europe is now more threatened by the USSR than in 1947-48, and he favors a "rebirth" of a strong NATO. All panelists agreed that the U.S. must maintain significant troop strength In Europe.

They also strongly supported U.S. efforts to develop stronger ties with China, efforts to do the same with smaller Communist nations in Europe (particularly Yugoslavia and Romania), and a new sophisticated increase in U.S. foreign aid toward carefully targeted areas. They favored negotiations, but always with a determination to get something important for every concession. They did not stress the United Nations as an especially useful arena for such negotiations.

In summary, Panel III sees the USSR as an increasingly adroit and ambitious competitor with continuing goals for worldwide dominance, leaving the United State with no viable alternative except to develop the requisite will and abilities to meet this competition successfully if a world secure for "humane values" is to be achieved. while they were important they nc. a decisive factor. This is true, they contended, even of the armed forces, which some observers have seen as a possible "kingmaker" in future Soviet politics. Paul K.

Cook noted that twice In post-World War II history the armed forces have had an opportunity to take over and did not do so even when their leader was a popular hero with political ambitions. "Bonapartism is not in the Russian tradition," Pipes added. Even with easier U. s. Soviet relations, the panel members saw little possibility of a great expansion of trade between the two countries though Soviet Western European trade could Increase considerably.

The problem, Nove said, is "what can you buy from them? They are mainly exporters of raw materials. "The problem," Nova declared, "is can you buy from them? They mainly export raw materials which you produce yourself or caD obtain more readily elsewhere." Moscow's Red Square. Polcrovslcy Cathedral in Panel Experts Appraise Significance Of Movements Within USSR Paul K. Cook, moderator, chief, Soviet Internal Affairs Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U. S.

Department of State M. Michel Tatu, foreign editor, Le Monde, Paris Dr. Alec Nove, professor of economics, University of Glasgow Dr. Richard Pipes, director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University By PAUL UNDERWOOD I Professor of Journalism Ohio State University Nationality issues stemming from, the domination of the so-called Great Russians over the variety of other peoples that make up the Soviet Union is one of Moscow's major interal problems This was one point of agreement reached by the members of Panel One in their discussion of the main forces at work within the Soviet Union. All four felt, for example, that should a war break out between Russia and China, if there were no quick, clearcut Soviet victory we would see a breakup of the Soviet Union along ethnic lines, with various nationalities at least attempting to ji'o iheir own way.

In its discussion the panel dealt with a wide range of questions dealing with the impact of historical attitudes, geographical position and political and economic problems as they affect Soviet policy waking. MANY OF THE questions con No. 1 viet forces were in strength in that area, too. CONCERNING INTERNAL politics, all four panelists agreed that Marxist ideology is no longer if Indeed it ever was an important factor in the formulation of national policy. Describing ideology as a kind of spectacles through which the Russians view developments, Dr.

Alec Nove declared it was impossible to Identify any Soviet action as due solely to ideology. "The Kremlin acts, and has acted, on the basis of perceived national Interests," Michel Tatu added. Soviet Chinese differences, differences that, In the opinion of panel members has led to a change of geographic priorities in policy determination. Where in the past the Kremlin's main concern was with Russia's western borders, now the emphasis has shifted to the long frontier with China. added that the southern Soviet border with Iran and Afghanistan also was a matter of concern to the Soviet leaders because it was relatively undefended.

However, Cook said this situation had been recently changed and So L. i -1- in ry ii i- i 1 1.