Blue Island Sun Standard from Blue Island, Illinois • Page 23

Section II Page 7 Sun-Standard Newspapers, Thursday, May 12, 1977 Lt. Col. tells how bridge battle was fought (Editor's note: In Marai, U)15, American troops captured intact the bridge across the Rhine riuer at Rematjen. The crossing of the Rhine broke an important barrier in the American invasion of Germany. Lt.

Col. Lothar Brune, of the German army, is in Blue Island visiting his relatives, Henry and Phyllis Baumann. He has written the Jollounng account of that battle, from the German point of view. This is the first time Brune's article has ar peared in print in English.) By LT. COL.

LOTHAR BRUNE The events centered on Remagen in March of 1945 have always met with vivid interest as with these events the very last chapter of the most unfortunate second World War in Europe was initiated. It was then and there that for the first time the important natural obstacle in the western part of the Reich, the Rhine river, was crossed. LT. LOTHAR BRUNE The Rhine had always been a barrier of utmost factual and psychological bearing. This accounts for the high importance that high-ranking military persons on the German side as well as on the side of the Allies attach to these events.

-By the beginning of March 1945, the area still under military control of the Reich had considerably i a a Rundstedt, with his chief of staff, General Westphal. had his headquarters near Bad Nauheim. The German forces' mis- sion was to defend the Reich, leaning upon the Siefgried line (Westwall). Defensive positions on the Rhine had not been prepared as Hitler was prejudiced against rear defensive positions. He believed that such positions would invite his forces to give up terrain more easily.

The side of the Allies there were the two army groups which had advanced from the Normandy beach head: the 21st Army Group under General Montgomery. deployed in the Netherlands and on the Lower Rhine; the 12th Army Group under General Omar Bradley, standing west of Cologne, in the Eifel mountains and in Luxembourg. General Bradley's 12th Army Group was composed of two armies, the 1st Army under General Hodges, and the 3rd Army under General Patton. On the 6th of March 1945 Major General Millikin with his III corps on the right wing of the 1st army had penetrated deeply into the German forces along the boundary between the German 5th Tank army and the German 15th army. In the evening of the 6th of March, the 9th U.S.

Armored division was situated in the area Euskirchen- Rheinbach-Meckenheim in a forward position. Commanding officer of the German Remagen combat forces was Capt. Bratge who was in charge of the convalescent company 105 which on the 7th of March had an actual strength of 35 men. Since the beginning of the war, the defense of the Rhine bridges had been the mission of local rifle and combat engineer units. Capt.

Friesenhahn and his men from the 12th company of the local Engineer regiment 12 were detailed to do the job. When the special demolition-blocks which had been cast in special molds to fit the chambers of the Remagen bridge were reclaimed at the Darmstadt depot, it was found out that, in the meantime, the ammunition had been used elsewhere. However, the necessary charges were fabricated again and installed in time. One platoon of 20 mm four- barreled AA guns under the command of Lt. Peters was standing ready to defend the bridge.

The Remagen railroad bridge had been built from 1916 to 1918 as a double- track bridge to connect the railroad line along the Ahr river with the railroad net east of the Rhine. The bridge stood almost exactly in the South-to- North direction. It had a total length of 1065 feet. At the northern head which faced the East bank of the Rhine, the tracks ran through a tunnel, 1255 feet in length, which had been broken through the Erpeler Ley, a rock formation surmounting the Rhine, its crest being 443 feet high. Behind the tunnel, the tracks made a left turn to join the main line on the East bank of the Rhine.

On the West bank of the Rhine, a so-called preliminary demolition had been prepared. It was supposed to blast an anti-tank ditch which was to block vehicular traffic. For the demolition of the bridge itself. 1323 pounds of 7 were at hand. The blast was supposed to be triggered by firing wire.

Two fuses, one main and one reserve fuse, had been installed. As a third measure, a so- called noncalculated charge had been provided which, like the main charge, could be initiated from the east bank. 1323 pounds of engineer explosives had been requested for this noncalculat- ed charge, but only 660 pounds of Donarit, a commercial explosive, were delivered. In the morning of the 7th of March, around 11 o'clock, the explosives arrived at the bridge. Technical calculation based on engineers regulations of that time revealed that at least 926 pounds of Donarit would have been required for an effective noncalculated charge.

On the 6th of March, the LXVII Army corps under General Hitzfeld was engaged in defensive action between Schmidtheim and Munstereifel. The corps was part of the 15th army engaged in this area, assigned were the 89th and the 277th division, both weakened by previous defensive operations. At 7 p.m. on the 6th of March, the following order from the Army was received by telephone: Assault units of the Allies had reached the area of Meekenheim-Rheinbach and were closing in on Ersdorf. German forces held positions near Fritzdorf-Eckendorf-Gelsdorf.

The city of Bonn was endangered. The 272nd i i i (LXXIV. corps) was engaged in combat on a line between Todenfeld-Queckenberg against attacking enemy forces. "The LXVII corps will immediately withdraw one division from its own sector taking the risk of complete exposure on the western front. "The LXXIV corps will detach its 272nd division to LXVII corps.

LXVII corps will prevent enemy advances toward the Southeast by an attack across the line of Ahrweiler-Kalenborn toward Fritzdorf-Gelsdorf. "The sector of LXVII corps will be occupied by LXVI corps. A computation conducted by the LXVII corps shows that the order cannot be carried out, because the enemy, in all probability, will have pushed through the next morning, directing his armored forces toward the southeast and the Rhine, long before the ordered attack of the LXVII corps will take effect. In a telephone conversation with the commanding general of the army, the corps commander tries to convince army headquarters that the order will not work. He fails, and, as a consequence, gave the following orders: "The 272nd division will immediately be placed under the command of LXVII corps.

It will prevent the advance of the enemy toward the Southeast and the south across the line Fritzdorf-Gelsdorf. "It will try to lean upon the Remagen bridge head. The 277th division will be pulled from the front tonight and will be employed in an attack on Gelsdorf via Altenahr. Dividing line against 272nd division will be Bad Neuenahr-Eckern- dorf. "Advance elements of 277th division are expected to reach, as a first objective, the highgrounds east of Kalenborn in the morning of the 7th of March." Between 8:30 and 10:30 p.m., General Hitzfeld arrived at the command post of the 89th division at Mahlberg in order to discuss the relief of the 277th division.

The situation, meanwhile, had grown worse. Heavy fighting was underway at Holzheim, three miles northwest of Munster-Eifel. Strong armored enemy- forces were pressing against weak friendly infantry forces. The surrender of Munster-Eifel was only a matter of time. When General Hitzfeld got back to Falkenberg at 10:30 p.m., he met with the commanding general of the LXVI corps, General Lucht, who was to take over the sector.

At 11 p.m., General Hitzfeld had another telephone conversation with the commanding general of the army, General von Zangen, to whom he tried to suggest that those elements of the LXVII corps ready to march off, go on to Remagen and establish a front west of Remagen. At the same time, he asked for release from the given orders. In his opinion, the turning point was not Gelsdorf, but Remagen. This request, and a third proposal he made to the commanding general of the army at midnight to the effect that the defense of the Ahrtal be ordered, leaning upon the Remagen bridge head, were rejected. At 1 a.m.

on the 7th of March, the following order from the 15th army was received by telephone at How your congressman voted By ROLL CALL REPORT WASHINGTON--Here's how your area members of Congress were recorded on major roll call votes April through May 4. HOUSE AMBASSADOR YOUNG-Rejected. 91 for and 318 against, an amendment to prevent United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young from increasing the staff of his Washington office by five persons, to an estimated total of 16S. The amendment sought to delete SWi.OOO for the five staff salaries from the fiscal 197S Stale department authorization bill HR 6689). later passed and sent to the Senate.

Debate centered on Young's performance as ambassador. Rep. Robert Bauman R- the -sponsor, said Young should be denied UK- staff increase because "if he continues to malsr statements ibal embarrass the Vniu-d States, then we in the U.S. ''ngrcss otfihl not 10 grant any additional staff be used" to propagandize his -kirns." An opponent. Rep.

John Buchanan the would enable Young 10 better with tconcn-ssmen as Ban He added this 1ha1 almost imidenl that has been Mown out of pro portion has hern 1wis! in press reports has hern oifhand nmmen1 that has been turned into a serious foreign po5i Male mcnt the press." Reps. Morgan Murph (D-2). Henry Hyde (R-6) Philip Crane (R-12). Tom Corcoran (R-15) voted "yea." Reps. Ralph Metcalfe (D- 1).

Martin Russo (D-3). Edward Derwinski (R-4). John Fan- (D-5). Cardiss Collins (D-7). Dan Rostcnkowski (D-8).

Sidney Yates (D-9th). Abner Mikva (D-10). Frank Annunzio (D-ll). Robert McClory (R-13), John Erlenborn" (R-14). John Anderson (R-16).

George O'Brien (R-J7) Thomas Railsback (R-19J. Paul Findley (R-20). Edward Madigan (R-21). George Shipley (D-22) and Paul Simon (D-24) voted "nay." Rep- Melvin Price did not vote. VIETNAM AID--Adopted.

2fi6 for and 331 against, an amendment preventing any money in the fiscal 1S7S Stale department authorization bill from being spent lo negotiate reparations payments to 1he Vietnamese. The bill HR was later passed and j.cnt 1o the Senaio. Although no money in the bill is intended for such negotiations, the sponsor. Rep. Ashbrook said his amendment wa.

a nwssan precaution He the as a statement "for the record" on 1he issue of pa? ing the Vietnamese for war damages Warn opponents of the amendment also oppose reparations, but said Ashbrook's amendment would jeopardize MIA negotiations and noted that HR 6689 was the wrong legislative vehicle for such an amendment. "I believe the American people would not want to give reparations to the Vietnamese." said Ashbrook. An opponent. Rep. Sonny Montgomery said he is "afraid that under the gentleman's amendment we would eliminate any talks at all on the return of the MLVs." Murphy, Rnsso, Fary.

Hyde. Rostenkowski. Annunzio. Crane, McClory. a A O'Brien, Michel.

Findley. Madigan and Shipley voted "yea." Metcalfe. Dcrwinski. Collins. YaJes.

Mikva. Erlenborn and Simon voted "nay." Railsback and Price did not vote. STRIP MIXING--Passed. 241 for and against a mining bill requiring surface miners of coal to restore land to its approximate original condition. Among other provisions, the bill HR 2) would las mining companies to raise money for such reclamation and protect certain areas such as national park lands from strip mining.

States would administer the federal law. A similar bill 5s waring flow consid oration in Senate One supporter. Kcp Ix-on Panetta said. "The issue is a basic one--will we Triage use of the technology we now available to us to restore 1 and preserve the brautj of thousands of acres of land in this nation? I believe we must." Rep. James Quillen (R- an opponent, said, "Today, as has happened ever tlie past four years, we have the same bad bill before us.

trying to hamstring strip mining in the Appalachian area, trying to bring it to a dead halt, trying to stop the production of coal when we need more energy." Russo. Fan-. Hyde. Collins, Rostenkowski, Yates. Annunzio.

McClory. Erie Corcoran. Anders i. Michel. Findley, Madigan.

Shipley and Simon voted "yea." Deminski voted "nay." Metcalfe. Murphy, Crane, Railsback and price did not vote. SENATE A 1 43 for and 45 against, an amendment to require congressmen and other federal officials to fly coach ralher than first-class. Also, the amendment was aimed at prnale businessmen who claim first-class air travel as a business de- durticn. It sought lo disallow as a expense the difference between the cost of first-lass and coach tickets, leaiing onh coach tickets fully deductible.

The amendment was proposed to HR 3477. the Carter Administration's economic- stimulus package, later passed and sent lo confer- ence. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D- the sponsor, said. "The additional cost of first-class travel is primarily a luxury item and should not be With a corporate tax rate of 48 per cent, each dollar of deductible expense saves the corporation 48 cents in Therefore, the average taxpayer pays half the cost of the first-class ticket." Sen.

Russell Long CD- an opponent, said the issue was one of "freedom of choice" because "if we are going to tell people they cannot fly first class then we should" go the rest of the way and tell them when they get there they cannot take a cannot go to the good restaurants, they have to go to the McDonald's and so forth." Sen. Charles Percy (R) voted "nay." and Sen. Adlai Stevenson (D) did not HOtSING--Adopted, 57 for arid 39 against, an amendment increasing J6.2 billion the budget au thorily for low-income housing assistance payments, known technically as "set- lion fl" assistance The coming during consideration of 1be Sen ale's fiscal 137X budget res olwtion (S Con Res raised to billion the projected section oullaj 01 er ibe mulli-jcvir lifr contracts brlwf-n in and pmate landlords Percy and corps headquarters of the LXVH corps: "Remagen bridge head subordinated to LXVII corps. Corps' mission will remain unchanged. One battalion and AA artillery will go to Remagen." Thus, the responsibility for the important crossing point of Remagen was placed on a corps which at that time was engaged in combat 37 miles away from the Rhine while enemy forces were 8.5 miles away from Remagen.

Furthermore, the corps was handicapped by the order requiring it to attack Gelsdorf from out of the Altenahr area. As may be deducted from the various telephone conversations on the subject between the commanding general of corps and the commanding general of the army in the evening of the 6th of March, the Remagen mission seemed to be of the utmost importance to General Hitzfeld, although, at least at that time, it was highly unwelcome to him. This is confirmed by an essay written by the general and published in the periodical "Soldat im Volk" in 1965. General Hitzfeld believed, however, that the forces in Remagen would be strong enough to stand their ground until he would be able to give his corps a chance to lean upon Remagen as soon as his mission "attack on Gelsdorf" would have been accomplished. As the corps did not know anything about the situation at Remagen and since there were no signal communications available at all, and the chief of staff still not having returned from his contact with the 272nd division, the corps commander gave his aide-de-camp Major Scheller the following orders: "A strong enemy attack on Remagen from out of the Rheinbach area is soon to be expected.

"You will take a small group with you (one officer, one radio set. eight soldiers) to Remagen. I appoint you Commandant of Remagen. All forces in the Remagen area will be under your command. "Your mission will be to form a tight bridgehead with the forces supposed to be at Remagen.

(one battalion and anti-aircraft artillery)- and to form an extended bridgehead with the forces you will find there during the day and which may intend to cross the Remagen bridge." and to obtain information on the technical details of the bridge and to get the bridge ready for blasting. "Depending on the situation, you may nave to give the blasting order yourself and to mate the necessary arrangements right awaj Blasting will have lo lake place at the lalesl when the enemy enters the west side of the bridge Major Scheller departed 2:45 a m. The chief of staff of the corps. L1. Col.

GS Warning, at 3 30 amc back from Ihe CP of 1hc 272nd division 1o Kaft- nberg. He had found the dnision to be in a poor Mate. The bulk of the 2771h dm sion at that lime was on Ihe march on the road Schuld BrwV. or Kffelsberg-Kreii? brrg. re-spec lively, with an adxance element in Alten ahr Upon appropriate brief- ing, the division eommand- ei started the altaek in the direction of Gelsdorf.

At around 10:30 a.m., the 177lh division had succeeded in gaining height 345 east of Kalenborn, but was tied up fighting enemy tanks. The bulk of the division was assembled in the area around At this time, Major Scheller was a little way off Remagen. He arrived there at 11:15 a.m.; at the same time, enemy forces were near Remagen and Sinzig. This proves the validity of a i computation. As mentioned before, the III U.S.

corps under the command of Maj. Gen. Millikin had made a breach along the boundary between the 15th German army and the 5th German Tank army on the 6th of March 1945. The corps had four divisions, one of them, the 1st U.S. division under Maj.

Gen. Clift Andrus was committed against the city of Bonn, another one, the 9th division under Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard, was supposed to take the area of Remagen-Sinzig.

Combat Group under Brig. Gen. i i a M. Hoge. started out from Meckenheim in the morning of the 7th of March to attack Remagen, while Com- 1 bat Group A was advancing further to the South.

Combat Group had two assault groups, one of them, under Lt. Col. Engeman, was heading for Remagen. It was made up of three armored infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one field artillery battalion and one engineer battalion. The assault group of Lt.

Col. Prince was supposed to attack Sinzig. The advance guard of Engeman's assault group on the 7th of March was a company of the 27th Armored Infantry battalion, 2nd Lt. Karl H. Timmermann commanding.

This company starting from Meckenheim took the route toward Remagen. Shortly after 11 a.m. of that morning, Lt. Timmermann had a first glimpse on Remagen and the Remagen bridge when he and his men came out of the woods above Remagen on the Birresdorf road. On the 7th of March, the German convalescent company of Capt.

Bratge had an actual strength of 35 men. The bulk of this fighting force was deployed at the Waldburg west of Remagen. There, on a high ground named Viktoriahohe, Capt. Bratge saw a good chance to cover the area toward the West. His unit was armed with machine guns and bazookas.

The heavy weapons available at Remagen. the al- ready-mentionned platoon of four-barreled AA guns- were changing position to the East bank of the Rhine in the direction of the Er- peler Ley. This platoon was not subordinate to Capt. Bratge. At 11:15 a.m.

Maj. Scheller. who had been appointed combat commander at Remagen by Gen. Hitzfeld, arrived at Remagen. The reason for his delay- on the trip from Falkenberg to Remagen was that he ran out of gasoline on the way and had to stop at Dedenbach to refuel.

He had left his radio set behind and was alone when he arrived at Hemagen. That is why Gen. Hitzfeld never learned about the Remagen events. Scheller and Bralge had only just exchanged a few words of briefing and change in responsibilities when a report came in that the German screening forces had had contact with the enemy. Capl.

Bratge gave Maj. Scheller a quick terrain briefing. At 11:10 a.m., they both went back to the bridge. While Bratge advocated an early blasting of Ihe bridge and a covering position on the right bank of the Rhine, as there were no infantry forces over there, Maj. Scheller wanted to defend the bridgehead on the left bank and to recruit forces from the withdrawing units in order to put up a defense.

This plan failed. When at 12:25 p.m., the screening force sitting on Viktoriahohe were called in order to be told to withdraw, there was no answer. At 12:40 p.m., a report came in that "enemy forces are in Bodendorf." At 12:50 p.m., the command post of the combat commander is moved from the left bank of the Rhine into the tunnel on the east bank. This is about the time when U.S. forces broke through the combat outpost on Birresdorf road.

At 1:10, the covering company was ordered to withdraw onto the bridge. At 1:40, the commanding officer of the screening forces on Viktoriahohe arrived at the tunnel and reported that most of his men were taken prisoner. At 2:35, the preliminary demolition on the left bank of the Rhine was released. The order to blast the bridge was given at 3:20. The main blast failed as the two blasting wires had been damaged by a chance hit.

Eight minutes before, the blasting wires had been checked for operational readiness. They had been intact. When the noncalcu- lated charge was released right after the failure of the main charge, the missing 266 pounds of explosives in the charge make themselves felt: the bridge was lifted a little and then fell' back into its bearings. Shortly after, at around 4 p.m.. the first U.S.

infantrymen crossed the bridge. The engineers on the German side i i a started a counter-attack which failed because of the heavy U.S. machine gun and tank fire on the tunnel entrance. At 5 p.m., the German forces in the tunnel surrendered to U.S. forces.

Right after the U.S. attack across the bridge, Maj. Scheller had left his position in order to inform his superiors of the situation by telephone. Unfortunately, he did so without letting Capt. Bratge know about it.

Four days later a special court martial sentenced him to death for this fatal mistake. At this point. I shall end my detailed report on the events at Remagen. I could, of course, continue giving you an account of the fighting which went on for the next couple of days, I could tell you about the attempts to i a destroy the bridge, and, last, but not least, could inform you about the court martial proceedings which went on during March 11 and 12. 1945.

at Rimbach and Oberirsen, and about the sentences that this court, which had been appointed by Hitler himself, pronounced. Instead. I would like to point out that the failure to destroy the a bridge on the 7th of March 1945 turned out to be a stroke of good luck. Because of this failure, a good part of the Rhinelands. particularly the communities of Bad Neuenahr and Ahrweiler.

was spared the tribulations of combat: the outcome of the war would not have been influenced anyway. Reproduction or publication in whole or in part of "Remagen on the 7th of March. 1S45" is forbidden without the written consent of the author. Lt, Col. (GS) Lothar Brune, Bad Neuenahr, Finkenweg 1C, West Germany.

NEWSPAPER! Rockets to rainbows Joseph Burlini here constructs a metal wort for the "Rockets to Rainbows" at Chicago's Museum of Science and Indnstrj. March IS to Ma 15. His sculpture twirls and whirls, tilts and balances. The museum is at 57th street and Ukc Shore drive. Admission is free.

iWSPAPERI.